

Although there is some non-SFL research on the use of references to mental (including affective) processes, and stance in conversation (for example Chafe 1982, Shimanoff 1985, Anderson & Leaper 1998, Precht 2000, 2003), there is hardly any research within appraisal on conversation. Exceptions are Eggins & Slade (1997), Martin (2000b), and Adendorff & de Klerk (2005, on Xhosa English), but their data are limited, and contain hardly any affect; further, the focus is on appraisal resources in general.

Rosenberg notes that in emotion research there is 'too little exemplification of how actual conversations proceed' (Rosenberg 1990: 170, similar observations are made by Fiehler 2002: 80), and Galasiński points out that there 'are relatively few studies of discourse strategies employed by people accounting for, explaining, or simply telling stories about their emotions' (Galasiński 2004: 2-3). Similarly, Anderson & Leaper mention that there has been little research examining speaker's references to emotion in talk (Anderson & Leaper 1998: 419). Some (non-appraisal, non-SFL) analyses that do investigate emotion references focus on medical topics or types of discourse (for example Wowk 1989, Edwards 1999, contributions to Fussell 2002, Pittam & Gallois 2002) rather than ordinary conversation (on functions of emotion terms in German conversation, see Fiehler 1990:136).

News reportage

A general overview of linguistic research on news discourse is given in Bednarek (2006a); particularly relevant to the analysis of affect in news discourse are Ungerer (1997), and Edwards (1999).

Within appraisal theory, White (for example 1997, 1998, 2004c, 2006) analyzes a number of aspects of appraisal in news reportage, but does not focus in particular on affect. For instance, his research shows that interpersonal meanings occur in the headline/lead (which is often emotionally charged) and in following phases when 'elements of the Headline/lead nucleus are appraised, typically by some expert external source, in terms of their significance, their emotional impact, or by reference to some system of value judgement' (White 1997: 115). Bell (1991: 161-74) similarly analyzes textual structure, and notes that evaluation can be involved in the news story's Commentary part, providing 'the journalist's or news actors' observations on the action' (Bell 1991: 170). See also Iedema *et al.* (1994) on the construal of objectivity and subjectivity in media texts, with a focus on judgement, and Körner &

5 Mapping and Analyzing Affect

After looking at emotion terms and patterns in a large corpus (the BRC), the focus of Chapters 5 and 6 will be on a modification of appraisal theory and its application in a more detailed analysis of a much smaller corpus (a subset of the BRC). The following sections of Chapter 5 provide an overview of previous, related research, the data, and methodology, while Chapter 6 outlines the results of the analysis.

5.1 Appraisal research

There is a large amount of linguistic research on various aspects of the language of conversation, news reportage, fiction and academic discourse, but it is difficult to do justice to all. Instead, I shall comment mainly on appraisal analyses. Because of a somewhat critical attitude towards large-scale corpus analysis (Martin 2004b: 342), most appraisal studies analyze either individual texts or only small-scale corpora (White 1998, Coffin 2006), with many case studies (for example Humphrey 2006). As Kaltenbacher writes, 'SFL is traditionally qualitative, looking at individual pieces of discourse of relatively small size' (Kaltenbacher 2007: 90). In this respect, appraisal has been applied to the close analysis of many different kinds of text, such as a national inquiry report (Martin 2004a), a political speech, narrative, exposition, legal act (Martin 2002), stories, songs (Martin 2004c), an Act of parliament, a music review (Martin & Rose 2003), or a movie (Martin 1995, 2000a), to name but a few. Such analyses have emphasized the importance of references to affect in construing personae, negotiating sociality and solidarity (Martin 2004b) and aligning readers/hearers 'into a community of shared value and belief' (Martin & White 2005: 95).

Treloar (2003) on an appraisal analysis of four news reports with respect to news actors' speaking positions. Lassen (2006) focuses on appraisal in bio-technical press releases and Caple (forthcoming) is interested in the multi-modal/inter-semiotic construal of evaluative stance in a certain type of news story.

Fiction

Though there is much stylistic research on point of view/focalization in literature (which includes affect as one of several resources), such as Simpson (1993), Toolan (2001), and Rimmon-Kenan (2002), appraisal analyses remain case studies. Thus, Martin & White (2005) provide an examination of extracts of Annie Proulx's *Shipping News*, and Dorothy Sayers's *Strong Poison*, and Macken-Horarik (2003a) focuses on one written narrative (Judith Stammer, *Click*). Rothery & Stenglin (2000) deal with interpretations of literary texts. On various aspects of emotion references in literature, outside appraisal theory, see van Meel (1994), Dijkstra *et al.* (1995), Watson (1999), and Oatley (1994, 2003).

Academic discourse

Outside SFL, there is a large body of research on evaluation (including affect) in written (and more rarely, spoken) academic language, such as Hyland (1999, 2000), Hunston (1994), Bondi & Mauranen (2003), Sandlund (2004) – an overview is given by Hood (2006: 37–8). Within appraisal theory, Coffin (2006; which was not available at the time of writing) provides a study of the language of the Australian secondary school history classroom, with an interest in the language of time, cause and evaluation, and Hood (2005, 2006) analyzes appraisal in research articles.

5.2 The corpus

The corpus that was used for the manual text analysis is a subset of the BRC, consisting of 85,121 words (based on a Microsoft Word count; includes the names of speakers in the conversation sub-corpus). In analogy to the 'BNC baby' (www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk), I shall refer to this as the 'BRC baby.' The BRC baby consists of about 20,000 words from each register:

Conversation	News reportage	Fiction	Academic discourse
22,613	18,164	20,563	23,781

For the conversation sub-corpus two random samples of 2–3000 words were selected from each of the social categories AB, C1 and C2, and one sample of about 6000 words from DE. The samples consisting of a whole recorded conversation in each case (files KBC, KBD, KE4, KDO, KE2, KD8, KBP). The news reportage sub-corpus contains samples of about 3000 words from the (broadsheet) categories of social news, arts, sports, science, political news and commerce (from files ALS, AJG, A75, A1N, A1M, A1G, A1E), and includes 30 news articles in total. For the fiction sub-corpus the first 2000 words or so were randomly sampled from ten files: AB9, AC2, BMW, C8T, CB5, CFY, FAJ, GOS, H9C and HR9 (these files are themselves samples from the beginning, middle or end of a novel). Finally, in the academic discourse sub-corpus we find two samples of about 2–3000 words each from files from the categories of natural science, politics/law/education, technical engineering, humanities and social science, and one sample of the same size from medicine (files A6 U, ACJ, ALP, AS6, EA7, EWW, FC1, FEF, FPG, HWV). More detailed information (including titles of books, type of sample, circulation size, level of difficulty, author gender, speaker age and occupation and so on) is listed in online Appendix A 6.1. Even though the sampling was relatively random, only those samples were chosen which contained the desired number of words (2–3000 words), which made up a relatively unified whole (for example a whole conversation), and which were also contained in the publicly available BNC baby corpus.

5.3 The analysis: theoretical and methodological considerations

In their recent book *The Language of Evaluation*, Martin and White note that the qualitative approach that they have taken up there should be complemented by 'a quantitative approach, which would focus on fewer variables across a corpus of texts' (Martin & White 2005: 260). This, they hope would 'encourage a reconsideration of evaluative meaning'. They also note that 'our maps of feeling (for affect, judgement and appreciation) have to be treated at this stage as hypotheses about the organisation of the relevant meanings – offered as a challenge to those concerned with developing appropriate reasoning' (Martin & White 2005: 46). In the following sections I am taking up this challenge, and discuss some aspects of appraisal theory's maps of feeling with respect to findings from corpus linguistics and cognitive linguistics/psychology.

The aim is to outline the mapping of affect that was applied in the textual analyses presented in Chapter 6.

5.3.1 Portraying vs. creating emotion

Let's start with a discussion of the difference between what I shall call *portraying* and *creating* emotion. With respect to the analysis of affect in text and discourse, it is worthwhile to distinguish between two research questions:

- How can emoters' emotions be portrayed (portraying emotion)? and
- How do texts create an emotional response (in the reader) (creating emotion)?

The first question relates to how speakers or writers can portray their own (authorial affect) or others' (non-authorial affect) emotions, with a focus on the different ways of doing so. The second question relates to the creation of an emotional response or atmosphere in the text or reader. This may be connected to the distinction that is made in SFL in the description of *visual* (but not verbal) interpersonal systems, between affect (character depiction: facial/bodily affect) and ambience (colour options, creating a certain atmosphere or mood, evoking an emotional response in viewers) (Martin, Painter & Unsworth 2006). I want to focus predominantly on the former here (portraying emotion); for research that deals with the latter (creating emotion) see Ungerer (1997), Macken-Horarik (2003a), Robinson (2005) or Humphrey (2006).

As noted in Section 1.4, one of the factors according to which affect is classified in appraisal theory (Martin & White 2005: 47) concerns whether feelings are realized as a surge of emotion involving para- or extralinguistic manifestation or whether they are more mentally experienced as an ongoing emotional state: **behavioural surge** (*the boy laughed, the captain wept*) vs. **mental disposition** (*the boy liked the present/felt happy, the captain disliked the present/felt sad*). In an earlier approach to affect, Martin and Rose (2003: 26–7) in fact mention *three* different ways of relating emotions: (1) writers can either use words that label emotions (*fear*), or (2) use words that denote 'behaviour that also directly expresses emotion' (Martin & Rose 2003: 26) (*shrieks*), or (3) describe 'unusual behaviour which we read as an indirect sign of emotion' (Martin & Rose 2003: 27) (*be very quiet*). With the last – what

Martin calls 'behaviour which indexes emotion' (Martin 2002: 203), the reader needs to invest some cognitive effort in retrieving the emotion:

... from this unusual behaviour we know something is wrong but we can't be quite so sure about the exact emotion being expressed; we need to use a bit of psychology perhaps. Read in context, however, we do know what Helena's on about, because these symptoms are surrounded by explicit references to emotions which tell us what the strange behaviour means. (Martin & Rose 2003: 27)

These different ways of portraying emotions can thus be placed on a cline of implicitness, as in Table 5.1. In this table, the broken line between behavioural terms and the description of unusual behaviour signals that the latter is '[r]elated to [the former], and sometimes hard to distinguish from it' (Martin & Rose 2003: 27).

In order to elaborate on this three-fold distinction and to consider in more detail and more systematically how emotional responses can be portrayed linguistically, let's briefly look to psychology. In Section 1.3 it was noted that emotions are often defined as involving:

- an eliciting condition/antecedent event
- a cognitive evaluation¹

Table 5.1 Cline of implicitness

Describing emotions	Examples (from Martin & Rose 2003, Martin & White 2005)		less implicit (less inferencing) ←
	the use of mental disposition terms	the use of behavioural surge terms	
the use of behavioural surge terms	<i>fear, worry, pain, ecstatic, wild consuming fear</i>	<i>restless, terrible convulsions, shrieks, wept, smiled, tremble, shudder, cower, whimper, cry, wail, chuckle, laugh, rejoice, shake hands, hug, embrace, restless, twitching.</i>	
the use of description of unusual (physical) behaviour	<hr style="border-top: 1px dashed black;"/> <i>shaking, start, cry out, faint, fidget, yawn, tune out, pat on the back, withdrawn, shake uncontrollably very quiet, staring, ice cold, drinking too much, wander from window to window, rolls this way, that side of the bed</i>		→ more implicit (more inferencing)

- a physiological response
- an action readiness/an action²

In this sense, 'emotions are complex physiological-affective-cognitive responses to the physical and sociocultural environment' (Schrauf & Sanchez 2004: 267). If we assume that non-psychologists' folk knowledge of emotions also includes these aspects, that is, that people are at least dimly and sub-consciously aware of these factors (as proposed by Kövecses 2000: 130; for a discussion see Radden 1998: 289-92), their knowledge structures or *schemas* about particular emotions should include some knowledge about:³

- the kind of cognitive evaluation associated with an emotion;
- prototypical and potential antecedent events (eliciting conditions) that cause a specific emotion;
- psycho-physiological expressions that are prototypically and potentially caused by a specific emotion;
- expressions of action readiness;
- prototypical and potential subsequent actions that are caused by a specific emotion.

People need and use this knowledge to understand/interpret their own and others' emotions, to interact adequately with others, and to interpret the representation of emotional experience (for example in art).

Emotion terms can then be regarded as 'a shorthand, an abbreviated way to refer to the various events and processes which comprise the phenomenon of emotion' (Ekman 1997: 3). In cognitive linguistic terms, our folk model of emotion is structured in terms of schema knowledge – involving categories, interrelations, default assignments (prototypes), and expectations, and words can 'trigger' the 'activation' of such a schema (see Bednarek 2005a for an overview of relevant research). These assumptions are confirmed by a large body of research from cognitive linguistics as well as cognitive and cognitive-social psychology, and by other researchers on emotion (for example Shaver *et al.* 1987, Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989: 92-3, Russell 1991, White 1990, Gottman *et al.* 1996: 251, Kövecses 2000, Mees 2006: 7, Oatley *et al.* 2006: 184). For instance, it has been shown that speakers are aware of typical behaviour, situations and cognitive evaluations of the environment that are associated with emotions (Ortony *et al.* 1988: 3, Wolk 1989, Parkinson & Manstead 1993: 300). (Though it is in fact debatable if this knowledge corresponds to actual emotional experience in real life situations – Parkinson &

Manstead 1993: *passim*, Shaver *et al.* 1987: 1062.) Many words in English refer explicitly to parts of emotion schemas (antecedent event, evaluative process, physiological state, action, situational circumstances and so on; see Heelas 1986, Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989, Bellelli 1995, Fiehler 2002), triggering inferences about the emotional response involved. It seems as if, in English at least, the ways of referring to emoters' emotions as set out in Table 5.2 (on page 150) seem possible.⁴

Whereas mental disposition terms can refer to the whole schema, other ways of portraying emotion make reference only to parts of the schema (part-whole relationship). As Kövecses notes, there are many linguistic expressions in English that describe *physiological expressions* of emotions, which can be considered as metonymies. This metonymic relation can be postulated as a general principle: THE PHYSIOLOGICAL AND EXPRESSIVE RESPONSES OF AN EMOTION STAND FOR THE EMOTION (Kövecses 2000: 134). We have seen examples of this in Section 4.3 and there is much research reporting on this (for example Enfield & Wierzbicka 2002). On the other hand, *behaviour* that has to do with emotions (for example hiding, banging things around, slamming doors, kicking things, hugging) – what are sometimes called *action cues* – has not received much attention in research on emotion (Planalp 1999: 47). These behaviours seem relatively important for emotion talk, however. Bamberg notes that 'people, when asked to give emotion accounts (of how they or others once felt), construe elaborate circumstances around happenings and events, that is, seek refuge in the "world of actions"' (Bamberg 1997b: 25). Finally, *causes* of affect become apparent only through the context, and are extremely varied, as Planalp suggests for conversation:

It is especially difficult to determine the objects or causes of emotion or feelings in conversations because emotions can be about or caused by practically anything. In conversation, objects of emotion can be verbal (jokes or even the topic of conversation), nonverbal (gestures), people (your partner or yourself), thoughts (daydreams), or even emotions themselves (guilty about enjoying the ethnic joke or anger about your partner's jealousy). They can be something as microscopic as a compliment, an insult, an interruption, or a touch or, alternatively, something as macroscopic as a stressful interview, an exciting argument, or a lifetime of frustrating interactions.

(Planalp 1999: 17)

Generally speaking, causes are often unusual/exceptional events (Fiehler 1990: 233), for example threats of social rejection, loss (for

example of relationships), disapproval, insults, receiving esteem, love and so on (Planalp 1999: 18). Causes (or situations) are often part of comparisons, for instance: *He felt like a man who has just had a tooth drawn which has been hurting him a long time* (from Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina*, quoted in Wierzbicka 1999: 12).

These different types of describing affect clearly interact in texts. As an example, let's look at an extract from the news reportage sub-corpus (see also Section 4.2). Literal and figural emotion terms are underlined, references to emoter's behaviour is in bold face, and references to causes of emotions are *in italics*:

- (1) THE HATE TRAP
Homes can't be sold
Couples can't split
Families live in hell

THOUSANDS of couples who hate each other are trapped together in a living hell *because of the slump*.

The tormented partners have had to put off their divorce actions as they can't sell their homes.

Now they are stuck with each other, locked in violence and miser with no end in sight, lawyers revealed yesterday.

MEN explode in frustration and batter their wives.

WOMEN strike back with anything that comes to hand – including knives and rolling pins.

SOME have nervous breakdowns and suffer stress and high blood pressure.

And CHILDREN are damaged by the constant tensions.

(BRC, CH2 9181-9192, from *The Daily Mirror*)

This extract illustrates well the prosodic nature of affect noted for example by Martin & Rose (2003) and Foley & Hood (2006), and that different types of affect 'often work together' (Martin & Rose 2003: 28) to create textual effects. This particular text starts with references to emotions and causes of emotions in the headlines and lead. It continues with this portrayal in its description of past events (*The tormented partners have had to put off their divorce actions as they can't sell their homes*). As we move on to the present (*Now*) we encounter the first description of behaviour caused by emotion (alongside references to causes and emotions), which is then continued in the following three sentences, with the final sentences referring to consequences of emotions (if we interpret *tensions*

Table 5.2 Ways of portraying emotions

How	Portraying emotions
Examples (from Bamberg 1997b, Bednarek 2005b, Martin & White 2005, TV)	referring to emoters' emotions
the use of mental disposition terms <i>fear, sadness, love, hate</i>	referring to emoters' psycho-physiological expressions of emotion
fixed figurative expressions <i>My heart sank, He had a broken heart</i>	referring to emoters' actions or behaviour (caused by emotion)
the use of behavioural surge terms <i>tremble, cry, his voice broke</i>	referring to emoters' actions or behaviour (caused by emotion)
describing mental behaviour <i>more difficult to talk to, more tense, more withdrawn</i>	referring to emoters' actions or behaviour (caused by emotion)
describing linguistic behaviour speech act terms <i>rubbish, abuse, revile, caution, scold, castigate, complain, complain, what the hell</i>	referring to emoters' actions or behaviour (caused by emotion)
emotional talk devices (Chapter 1) <i>fuck, shit, what the hell</i>	referring to emoters' actions or behaviour (caused by emotion)
describing (physical) behaviour actual <i>reward, commit, entrust, comfort, flee, caress, he seemed to have aged and lost weight</i>	referring to emoters' actions or behaviour (caused by emotion)
hypothetical <i>I could kill you, I could strangle you, I could kiss you, you touch my kids and you fight me'</i>	referring to emoters' actions or behaviour (caused by emotion)
describing elicitors/antecedent events <i>my biggest sister got into a car accident so she died, I moved to Worcester and I couldn't see my neighbors and their dogs; my Mommy hit me she hit me in the eye</i>	referring to causes of emotions

as an emotion term). The patterning is as follows (B = referring to emotions, C = referring to causes of emotions, B = referring to mental or other behaviour caused by emotions):

E - C - C - E - E - E - C - C - B - E - C - C - B - E - B - B - B - B - B - E

Different ways of portraying emotions are thus interesting in terms of textual patterning and prosodic structures, and clearly deserve more attention.

However, in the analyses of Chapter 6 the focus was on mental disposition terms (emotion labels) only, disregarding other ways of portraying an emoter's emotion. Shimanoff (1985: 19) reports an inter-rater agreement of only 20 per cent for more indirect references to affect,⁵ whereas the inter-rater agreement for emotion labels is 75.8 per cent. The focus on labels thus means a more reliable and more valid analysis of affect, but the disadvantage is that this 'may not get at the richness of the verbal expression of affect and emotion' (Anderson & Leaper 1998: 439).

5.3.2 Analyzing emotion terms in discourse

Limiting our attention to emotion labels, the focus now shifts to their analysis. Any such analysis will be subjective to a certain extent on account of the fuzzy nature of emotion lexis (discussed below). However, the text/discourse analyst must take either/or decisions, putting certain emotion terms in certain categories, and deciding what to include and exclude from the analysis. To provide an antidote, this section documents some important methodological decisions. All such decisions were consistent across the data; each file was analyzed twice (with a sufficiently large time interval between the analyses), and checked for accuracy several times. In problematic cases, paraphrasing, translating, and two dictionaries (an English-German dictionary and the *OALD*) were used, with Martin & White (2005) also being consulted for help with the coding of emotion terms where applicable. On account of the small corpus size (see Section 5.2), the analyses are to be considered illustrative rather than representative.

The data were analyzed and coded with the help of *Altova XMLSpy 2007*, an XML editor software (www.altova.com). This software allows the user to tag data with a number of attributes, here linguistic variables such as affect trigger, emoter, negation and so on. Image 5.1 shows an example. The software also allows you to automatically transform the results of the analysis into a tabular form, which we will see later. Each




Image 5.1 XML Spy Analysis

emotion term was coded on nine linguistic variables, but only five are relevant for the analyses in this book:⁶

1. emoter
2. trigger
3. affect type
4. covert-overt affect
5. valence

While the analysis of emoter and trigger is relatively straightforward, some more detailed remarks are necessary for affect type, covert vs. overt affect, and valence.

5.3.2.1 Classification of affect

As mentioned in Section 1.4, in current appraisal theory affect is classified according to a number of factors (numbered by me for convenience):

- Factor 1: emotions are grouped into three major sets: **in/security** (*the boy was anxious/confident*) – **dis/satisfaction** (*the boy was fed up/absorbed*) – **un/happiness** (*the boy was sad/happy*).
 - Factor 2: the feelings are culturally construed as positive or negative: **positive affect** (*the boy was happy*) vs. **negative affect** (*the boy was sad*).
 - Factor 3: the feelings relate to future states (triggers) or existing ones: **realis** (*the boy liked the present*) vs. **irrealis** (*the boy wanted the present*). Irrealis affect is categorized as **dis/inclination** (fear/desire).
 - Factor 4: the feelings are graded in terms of a cline of intensity: low (*like*) – median (*love*) – high (*adore*).
 - Factor 5: the feelings are construed as directed at/ reacting to some external agency or as a general mood: **reaction to other** (*the boy liked the teacher/the teacher pleased the boy*) vs. **undirected mood** (*the boy was happy*).
- (Martin & White 2005: 46–9).

While most of these factors are relatively self-explanatory, some more detailed comments on factors 1, 3 and 5 are necessary:

Un/happiness feelings are ‘concerned with “affairs of the heart” – sadness, hate, happiness and love’ (Martin & White 2005: 49), and can be sub-divided as indicating happiness or unhappiness. Such feelings can either be directed at a trigger or not (but compare the discussion of undirected affect in Chapter 3); see Table 5.3 (all examples in Tables 5.3–5.6 are from Martin & White 2005).

dis/satisfaction		dis/satisfaction	
ennui	displeasure	cross, bored with, angry, sick of,	involved, absorbed, engrossed
flat, stale, faded	interest	furious, fed up with	satisfied, impressed, pleased, charmed, chuffed, thrilled

Table 5.5 Dis/satisfaction

In/security		In/security	
disquiet	surprise	startled, jolted, staggered	confidence
uneasy, anxious, freaked out	together, confident, assured	comfortable with, confident	trust
		in/about, trusting	

Table 5.4 In/security

un/happiness		un/happiness	
misery [mood: 'in me']	antipathy [directed feeling: 'at you']	cheer	affection
down, sad, miserable	dislike, hate, abhor	cheerful, buoyant, jubilant	be fond of, love, adore
		happiness	

Table 5.3 Un/happiness

In/security feelings relate to 'emotions concerned with ecosocial well-being - anxiety, fear, confidence and trust' (Martin & White 2005: 49), with respect to our environment (including people), as visualized in Table 5.4.

Dis/satisfaction feelings, finally, involve 'emotions concerned with telos (the pursuit of goals) - ennui, displeasure, curiosity, respect' (Martin & White 2005: 49) (see Table 5.5). They have to do with:

achievement and frustration in relation to the activities in which we are engaged, including our roles as both participants and spectators. These oppositions take us to the borders of affect as it is popularly perceived, as reflected in Star Trek characters like Spock (a human/Vulcan hybrid who suppresses emotion) and Data (an android who feels none) - who occasionally express their fascination with things (Martin & White 2005: 50, original emphasis).

Additionally, let's look at factor 3 more closely, namely the suggestion that feelings can concern future (irrealis) or existing states (realis). This involves either fear or desire as illustrated in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Dis/inclination

	dis/inclination
disinclination	inclination
fear	desire
wary, fearful, terrorized	miss, long for, yearn for

Dis/inclination is not listed in the table as part of the classification of kinds of emotion (there are only three major groups of emotion listed: un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction) (Martin & White 2005: 49), but seems to be treated on its own terms. Presumably, this is because it differs from these three sets of emotion in terms of its irrealis trigger and its directedness (Martin & White 2005: 48). An opposition is set up between realis and irrealis (for example Martin & Rose 2003: 60-1), that looks as follows:

Affect [realis : un/happiness, in/security, dis/satisfaction
irrealis : dis/inclination

However, dis/inclination is also listed alongside un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction when talking about 'kinds of unhappiness' (Martin & White 2005: 51), and in example analyses desire is placed in the same column as cheer, misery, disquiet and so on (Martin & White

2005: 80-1), so that it seems reasonable to talk about dis/inclination as a fourth category or sub-type of affect.

As becomes apparent, all four categories of affect (un/happiness, dis/satisfaction, in/security, dis/inclination) involve both 'positive' (happiness, satisfaction, security, desire) and 'negative' (unhappiness, dissatisfaction, insecurity, fear) emotions (factor 2). In contrast, Galasiński argues that it is problematic to:

assign universal value to emotions and label them as positive or negative. Such an evaluation must be context-bound. I can imagine contexts (for example, those of abuse) in which the supposedly negative anger will be positive, as well as ones in which the supposedly positive love will, in fact, be negative (Galasiński 2004: 46).

However, the difference between positive and negative emotions is discerned by many researchers of emotion (cf. Jahr 2000: 7, Downes 2000: 104, Turner & Stets 2005), and examples such as that given by Galasiński can be disregarded in a more general framework: 'We are not concerned here with the value that a particular psychological framework might place on one or another emotion (cf. "It's probably productive that you're feeling sad because it's a sign that ...")' (Martin & Rose 2003: 59). In this book (for example Chapter 2), I have repeatedly used this 'positive-negative' classification of emotion terms (which we might label *valence* as is frequently done in emotion research), while also noting that a number of emotion terms do not easily fit into this classification (consequently labelled 'ambiguous/neutral'; see discussion below).




Figure 5.1 Affect and evaluation

Finally, concerning factor 5 (directed vs. undirected affect), let us assume that this distinction is theoretically valid, even though it is questionable how many references to affect really are undirected (Section 3.3.3). With directed affect we can then distinguish at least two elements (Figure 5.1, above):

- the attribution of some emotion to an emoter through the usage of an overt or covert emotion term;

- the evaluation of some entity (the trigger) on the part of the emoter in terms of this emotion (by construing the emoter's reaction with respect to this entity).

Importantly, the emoter can either be the self (authorial directed affect) or the other (non-authorial directed affect) (Section 1.4). With authorial affect, the self attributes an emotion to him/herself, and simultaneously provides an evaluation of some trigger, whereas with non-authorial affect both an emotion and an evaluation of some trigger are *attributed* to an other (Figures 5.2 and 5.3).




Figure 5.2 Authorial affect and evaluation




Figure 5.3 Non-authorial affect and evaluation

If we only consider the speaker of such utterances, the speaker of the utterance *I admire linguists* clearly expresses a positive evaluation of the trigger (*linguists*). This evaluative meaning depends on the cognitive evaluation associated with the relevant emotion schema (*admire*), and is therefore readily understood by hearers. People know that the emotion of 'admiration' involves a positive cognitive evaluation on the part of the emoter, and assume that this is implied when someone says *I admire linguists*.

On the other hand, the speaker of the utterance *He admires linguists* only attributes a positive evaluation of the trigger (*linguists*) to an emoter, but does not say whether s/he shares it. At the same time, non-authorial affect can imply a certain kind of evaluation on the part of the speaker. This may depend on the speaker's attitude towards the trigger: if the speaker dislikes linguists, saying that *John admires linguists* may imply

negative evaluation of John, but if s/he likes linguists, the same utterance may imply positive evaluation of John. Furthermore, *feeling rules* (Section 1.3), which tell us whether emotions are appropriate or inappropriate (Fiebler 1990: 85) may influence the evaluative meaning of non-authorial affect. For example, *a mother who hates her children* implies negative evaluation of the mother since the utterance refers to a socially unacceptable emotion (see also discussions in Bedford 1956/57: 294, White 1998: 105, Bamberg 1997b, Planalp 1999: 170–9, White 2004c: 240, Bednarek 2006a: 54–6). In other words, the evaluative meaning of non-authorial affect can depend on the reader/hearer's attitude towards the trigger or on social rules and expectations concerning emotional experience. These social expectations are extremely powerful. As the American writer Lionel Shriver, whom I have already quoted in Chapter 1, puts it:

[...] we are all profoundly normative. We have explicit expectations of ourselves in specific situations – beyond expectations; they are requirements. Some of these are small: If we are given a surprise party, we will be delighted. Others are sizable: If a parent dies, we will be grief-stricken. But perhaps in tandem with these expectations is the private fear that we will fail convention in the crunch. That we will receive the fateful phone call and our mother is dead and we feel nothing. I wonder if this quiet, unutterable little fear is even keener than the fear of the bad news itself: that we will discover ourselves to be monstrous.

(Shriver 2006: 92)

The difference in the evaluative meaning of authorial and non-authorial affect can have results on linguistic construals of affect. Thus, Bamberg shows that there are differences in how emotions are referred to in first person accounts versus third person accounts of 'anger' in terms of agentivity, individualization, probability and intention, to shift blame and save face (Bamberg 1997b: 8–9). Precht's large-scale corpus analyses suggest that there is a slight tendency for an expression about one's self to be more positive [...], and comments about others not physically present to be negative' (Precht 2000: 129). And Shaver *et al.* (1087: 1080–1) note differences in the construal of subjects' self-reports of emotional experience and reports of typical emotional experience. Non-authorial affect is particularly important in conflict situations, prevention, and the regulation of disappointment (Fiebler 1990: 132, who calls this *projektive Erlebensthematisierung* – 'a thematization of projected experience'). It may well be important for text analyses to be aware of these

distinctions. Occasionally, analysts might want to limit their analysis to authorial or non-authorial affect, respectively. In the analyses of Chapter 6 both are examined, since the focus of this book is on emotion talk as such. However, rather than using the current mapping of affect as just introduced, a modified version will be used which is outlined below.

5.3.2.2 Modification of affect types

While I do not want to attempt a completely new classification of emotion lexis, nor establish what Martin & White (2005: 51) call a *semantic topology* for this region of meaning,⁷ I want to suggest a modification of the present description of affect types, relating to the categories of in/security and dis/inclination.

In/security. If we consider un/happiness and dis/satisfaction, it becomes apparent that the positive sub-categories correspond exactly to, or 'mirror' the negative sub-categories (Table 5.7); but with in/security, this is much less the case (Table 5.8). This concerns in particular the opposition of trust and surprise. I therefore suggest setting up the system of in/security in analogy to the other systems, with the positive and negative categories 'mirroring' each other (Table 5.9).

Table 5.7 Sub-categories of un/happiness and dis/satisfaction

happiness	←	unhappiness
cheer	←	misery
affection	←	antipathy
satisfaction	←	dissatisfaction
interest	←	ennui
pleasure	←	displeasure

Table 5.8 Sub-categories of in/security

security	←	insecurity
confidence	←	disquiet
trust	←	surprise

Table 5.9 Modified in/security system

security	←	insecurity
quiet	←	disquiet
trust	←	distrust

Compared to the old system, confidence becomes subsumed under the more general (technical) term of *quiet*, having to do with emotional calm, as it were, as realized for example by lexical items such as *comforted*, *reassured*, *confident*, *solace*. Trust is now opposed to its opposite emotional response, distrust, rather than surprise, which falls out of the system. In other words, the proposal is that in/security feelings relate to disquiet (for example *uneasy, anxious, afraid, fear*) or quiet (for example *reassured, comforted, at ease, blithely*) as well as distrust (for example *reserve, emotional withdrawing, suspicious*) or trust (for example *confide, trust, believe in*) but do not include surprise. In fact, I propose to set up surprise as a separate type of affect, and to treat it on its own terms, with affect at this stage relating to four sets of affect or four different affect types (Figure 5.4).



Figure 5.4 Four sets of affect type

Apart from this new classification resulting in a more 'logical' structural organization of the in/security sub-category, it is based on the belief that surprise is not culturally construed as negative – which would be the implication if surprise were included as the 'negative' part of in/security. The problematic status of surprise in terms of appraisal theory also becomes apparent in that it is excluded in earlier frameworks, for example Martin (1997: 22). It has also been noted by some researchers that emotion terms labelling the emotion of surprise (for example *astorished, startled, surprised*) seem to be relatively neutral rather than clearly positive or negative (for example Nöth 1992: 73, Robinson 2005: 64). Supporting evidence for this belief comes from corpus data, which will now be discussed in more detail.

Firstly, I have investigated what kinds of bodily symptoms and behaviour are associated with a number of emotion terms in the fiction sub-corpus of the BRC (because this is where such associations are most frequent; see Section 4.3). Instances that were counted as examples for such associations include (see Sections 3.3.2 and 4.3):

- (2) gave a **delighted laugh...** (BRC, B1X 276)
- (3) He **smiled, pleased with...** (BRC, GUG 341)

- (4) a smile of affection (BRC, CEC 624)
- (5) He shook his head, bitterly disappointed (BRC, GUG 1725)
- (6) he rubbed his fingers through his hair and she could tell he was anxious (BRC, CKD 600)
- (7) the whites [of her eyes] showing like a frightened horse (BRC, BMR 822)
- (8) the dark eyes, smouldering with hate (BRC, CEC 2498)
- (9) Cleo's jaw dropped open in surprise (BRC, GW2 3033)
- (10) he sat frozen in his seat by surprise (BRC, AB9 2196)

Appendix A 4.2 online lists the associated bodily behaviour in detail, but here is a summary of the most important tendencies:

- *Delighted* (A) is associated with kissing and hugging, squeals and whoops, and, most importantly, with laughter and smiles.
- *Pleased* (A) is associated predominantly with smiling and grinning.
- *Affection* (N): is associated with eye contact, smiles, kissing and hugging.
- *Disappointed* (A) is associated with biting one's lips, sighing, shaking one's head, and a 'turning away' movement (*turn away, jump to her feet, turn*) or a 'downwards' movement (*sink back, sat on*).
- *Anxious* (A) is associated with red-eyes, a white face, clenched hands, shivering and rubbing one's fingers through one's hair.
- *Frightened* (A) is associated with wide eyes, crying, shouts and screams, a pale face and several types of body movement: fleeing, freezing, and clinging/squeezing as well as a high pulse.
- *Hate* (V) is associated with dark, blazing or smouldering eyes, staring, and a twisted mouth and face.
- *Surprise* (N, V) and *surprised* (A) are associated with wide eyes, and staring and looking, blinking/flickering eyes, smiling and laughing, screams, shouts, grunts, squeaks and gasps, speechlessness, raised eyebrows, an open mouth, shaking one's head, sudden body movements or freezing.

Table 5.10 Behavioural surges of surprise in fiction

Shared with 'positive' emotions	Shared with 'negative' emotions
squeals → delight laughter, smiles → delight, pleasure, affection	screams, shouts → fear wide eyes → fear freezing → fear

These results show that in fiction the emotion of surprise is associated with characters' behavioural surges that are also related to both 'positive' and 'negative' emotions (Table 5.10). In other words, surprise is associated both with behaviour normally related to 'negative' emotions (wide eyes, screaming, shouting, freezing) and with behaviour normally related to 'positive' emotions (laughter, smiles, squeals).

Secondly, we can look at emotions that are conjoined with *surprised* (A), *surprise* (V), and *surprise* (N) with the help of the conjunction *and*, and compare this with emotions that are conjoined with other emotion terms. Tables A.18-A.20 in Appendix A 5.1 online show the findings for all emotion term occurrences, looking at the structures *emotion term and* as well as *and emotion term*. The function of such doublets is rhetorical – similar to 'triplets such as *appalled, perplexed and repulsed*' (Martin 2004b: 342), indicating intensification (graduation). They also allow us to construe events from different emotional perspectives (Bamberg 1997b: 11).

Summing up the results, there is a tendency for 'positive' emotion terms (*delighted, enthusiastic, impressed, pleased, affection, admire*) to be conjoined with other 'positive' emotion terms, for example *relieved, pleased, encouraged, optimistic, grateful, kindness, love, trust*. Vice versa, 'negative' emotion terms (*anxious, disappointed, frightened, hate* (N), *hate* (V)) are typically (but not exclusively) conjoined with 'negative' emotion terms such as *tense, unhappy, fearful, miserable, frightened, ashamed, worried, cross, confused, despise, fear, anger*.

Surprise, on the other hand is conjoined much more equally with both 'positive' and 'negative' emotion terms (though 'negative' ones seem a bit more frequent), for example:

relief and surprise
embarrassment and surprise
fear and surprise
shock and surprise
surprise and admiration
surprise and pleasure
surprise and delight
pleased and surprised
happy and surprised
sad and surprised
shocked and surprised
touched and surprised
surprised and interested
surprised and relieved

surprised and flattered
surprised and irritated

This seems to support the assumption that surprise is not clearly construed culturally as a negative (or positive) emotion.

This is also borne out by some additional corpus findings. For instance, to *surprise* often co-occurs with expressions of volition (for example *hoping to, wanted to, urge to, it would be nice to*) in fiction, which clearly conceptualize this meaning of surprise as a positive emotion:

- (11) I was **hoping to surprise** you – a sort of unexpected wedding present, but it was no good. (BRC, FPM 2334)
 (12) “Well, I have three children of my own now and I thought it would **be nice to surprise** them with the sugar mice on the tree, and also the chocolate cat.” (BRC, AT7 409)

And as premodifying noun, *surprise* can occur with ‘negative’, (*surprise attack*) ‘neutral’ (*surprise move, surprise step, surprise decision*) and ‘positive’ (*surprise party, surprise gift*) lexis.⁸

This does not mean that surprise cannot be construed by a speaker/writer in a given context as a positive or negative emotion. For instance, we can use a lexical item such as *shock* which seems to *inscribe* (Martin & White 2005: 61) mostly negative (rather than neutral or positive) surprise:

Inscribed construal: *I was shocked* [negative surprise].

On the other hand, the positivity or negativity of an emotion such as surprise can be contextually implied with the help of other evaluations preceding or following the emotion term:

Contextually implied construal:

Prospective/cataphoric:

What a lovely [positive appreciation] *surprise* [positive surprise]

Retrospective/anaphoric:

I was surprised [positive surprise] *and delighted* [happiness].

In the case of prospective construal, the positive appreciation (Section 1.4) conveyed via *lovely* turns the surprise cataphorically, as it were, into positive surprise. In the case of retrospective construal, the conjoined positive emotion term *delighted* anaphorically turns the surprise into

positive surprise. In other cases, however, the construal of the surprise may remain unclear, ambiguous or rather neutral.⁹

Summing up the discussion so far, it appears that while a large number of emotions are culturally construed as positive or negative, some emotions (such as surprise) have a more ambiguous status (but may, though they need not, be construed in a given context as a positive or negative emotion). Other candidates for such an ambiguous status are desire or non-desire (see discussion below) – compare also Section 2.4 and Appendix A 2.4 online for further examples.¹⁰

Dis/inclination. The second modification of appraisal theory’s affect types concerns dis/inclination which I include as indicating a certain kind of emotion in the same way as un/happiness, in/security and dis/satisfaction. However, if we compare in/security and dis/inclination there seems to be some possibility for overlap between disinclination: fear and insecurity: disquiet, with both relating to emotions of anxiety or fear (Table 5.11). I thus propose to re-define dis/inclination as suggested in Table 5.12. Dis/inclination is here re-construed not in terms of a positive (desire) or negative (fear) emotion, but rather with respect to polarity, referring to desire (volition) and non-desire (non-volition).

Table 5.11 Fear vs. disquiet

inclination	disinclination
<i>desire</i>	<i>fear</i>
<i>miss, long for, yearn for</i>	<i>wary, fearful, terrorized</i>
security	insecurity
<i>quiet</i>	<i>disquiet</i>
<i>solace, comfort</i>	<i>uneasy, anxious, freaked out</i>

Table 5.12 Modified dis/inclination system

dis/inclination	
<i>desire</i>	<i>non-desire</i>
<i>miss, long for, yearn for, want</i>	<i>refuse, reluctant, disinclined</i>

It must be emphasized that non-desire relates to lexicalized (for example *refuse*) and morphological (for example *disinclined*) negation

only. This allows us to keep up the distinction that is made in appraisal theory between negative emotions and negated positive emotions:

We also find it useful to distinguish negative feelings from positive feelings that are grammatically negated, thus drawing a distinction between *sad* and *not happy*; by notating grammatical negation as 'neg', we can code *not happy* as 'neg + happy', opposed to *sad* as '-hap'. Morphological negation (eg *unhappy*, *insecure*) on the other hand is not arguable, since it is realised lexically ...; so we will code it as negative rather than negated attitude (ie -hap for *unhappy*, neg + hap for *not happy*)

(Martin & White 2005: 73).

This permits us to code *miss*, *willing* as 'inclination', and *not miss*, *not willing* as 'neg + inclination', in contrast to *refuse*, which is coded as 'disinclination', and *not refuse*, which is coded as 'neg + disinclination'. This does not mean, however, that inclination is considered positive and disinclination negative, since the organization of the relevant meanings is made in terms of polarity. This classification of dis/inclination in terms of polarity rather than positive/negative cultural construal takes into account the fact that neither desire nor non-desire seem to be unequivocally construed culturally as positive or negative. And the evaluation implied by desire and non-desire terms may also depend on the context: if I desire something that you do not think I deserve, or if I desire something that you think is bad (for example to steal, to lie, to cheat), your evaluation of me is presumably negative. But if I desire something that you think I deserve, or that you evaluate positively, your evaluation of me might be more positive. An example for negative desire is also represented by *envy*, a term for a specific type of desire which is culturally construed as negative.

The new set-up of dis/inclination avoids a double classification of emotion terms such as *fear* and *anxiety*, and takes into account the ambiguous status of desire in terms of cultural construal. It also takes into consideration the fact that irrealis cuts across all emotions, and can be realized differently, either grammatically (Martin & White 2005: 48) or lexically (*desire*, *want*, *fear*, *afraid of*); see Table 5.13. In other words, all emotions can relate to an irrealis trigger (for example *I'd be happy if...*) and dis/inclination is not the only type of affect that can be irrealis, though desire and fear terms usually lexicalize irrealis (*desire*, *want*, *fear*, *afraid of*). However, dis/inclination does seem different from the other types of affect in not allowing a realis trigger (Table 5.14).

We can set this up as an if-then relation (if dis/inclination then irrealis trigger), shown in Figure 5.5.

Table 5.13 Affect types and irrealis trigger

trigger	surprise	dis/inclination	un/happiness	dis/satisfaction	in/security
irrealis	I'd be pleasantly surprised if...	I don't want him to do this...	your parents would be delighted if...	I'd be furious if...	I fear that he might die
		I'd like to...	I'd hate it if...		I'm afraid of her leaving me

Table 5.14 Affect types and realis trigger

trigger	surprise	dis/inclination	un/happiness	dis/satisfaction	in/security
realis	I'm surprised that	- (?)	I'm delighted to meet you...	I'm bored with this...	This frightens me. I'm scared.




Figure 5.5 Affect type and (ir)realis trigger

A fuzzy system of modified affect. To recapitulate, I propose that we classify emotion terms according to five rather than three categories, and re-construct the systems of in/security and dis/satisfaction accordingly (Figure 5.6). In this Figure the broken line signals that this system is set up as a fuzzy system, with no clear boundaries between the affect types, and possible blends (such as *jealousy* as *disquiet* (in/security) and affection (un/happiness)). It is also assumed (in line with much psychological research into emotion terms, for example Shaver et al. 1987,




Figure 5.6 Modified affect system




Figure 5.7 Core and marginal emotions

Russell 1991) that linguistic affect is organized as a prototype category, with core, better and worse members, and family resemblances (Wittgenstein) between the category members. Un/happiness is core – ‘probably the first to come to mind when we think about emotions’ (Martin & White 2005: 49) – whereas surprise and dis/inclination as well as parts of dis/satisfaction (see above) are non-core members. On the one hand, this reflects psychologists’ debates about whether both interest (dis/satisfaction category) and surprise are cognitive rather than emotional states (on interest, see Ekman 1999a: 8, Milton 2005: 33); on the other hand, I assume that interest terms (for example *involved*, *absorbed*, *engrossed*) as well as surprise terms are considered as marginal rather than prototypical examples of emotion terms by speakers. And dis/inclination arguably refers to volition rather than emotion (volition and emotion are often differentiated, for example by Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 208) and it has no realis trigger. Both surprise and dis/inclination are also culturally not construed as positive/negative. Dis/inclination has only two sub-types, and surprise has only one, because there is no corresponding lexicalized emotion of ‘no surprise’ (even though we

can refer to this with the help of negation). We can visualize this as Figure 5.7, which captures this fact better than a system network, showing that un/happiness includes the most ‘core’ emotions (followed by in/security) and that surprise, dis/inclination and dis/satisfaction include more ‘marginal emotions’. This new classification is not neatly organized, and incorporates fuzziness and gaps, but arguably this is offset by the fact that it allows us to classify instances of emotion terms more realistically. It de-prioritises elegance in order to account for authentic linguistic data – in line with many current models of language, including but not limited to SFL (González-García & Butler 2006). Summing up, Table 5.15 compares the old and new categorization of affect types in detail.

Table 5.15 Comparison of affect types

Old		New	
un/happiness	happiness	un/happiness	happiness
misery	cheer	miser	cheer
antipathy	affection	antipathy	affection
in/security		in/security	
insecurity	security	insecurity	security
disquiet	confidence	disquiet	quiet
surprise	trust	distrust	trust
dis/satisfaction		dis/satisfaction	
dissatisfaction	satisfaction	dissatisfaction	satisfaction
emui	interest	emui	interest
displeasure	pleasure	displeasure	pleasure
dis/inclination		dis/inclination	
disinclination	inclination	disinclination	inclination
fear	desire	non-desire	desire
		surprise	

Affect types and basic emotions. A brief note on the relation between this proposed re-classification of emotion terms, and suggestions to classify emotions: even though there is no reason to suspect that there is a one-to-one relation between a classification of emotion terms, and a classification of emotions (and neither should be used to classify the other), it might be interesting to take a look at the kinds of emotions that are mentioned in psychological research.

Some researchers in fact treat all emotions as basically the same, with differences only in intensity and pleasantness (Ekman 1999a: 1),

while others differentiate between a number of 'basic' (Ekman 1992) emotions.¹¹ Generally speaking, there is no agreement in emotion research on how many emotions there are, how many are basic, how they are to be distinguished, or which causes and consequences they have (Jahr 2000: 24). But Ekman (1992: 170) points out that there is quite a lot of overlap concerning basic emotions (for a helpful overview see also Turner & Stets 2005: 13–15). And Jahr notes that most researchers seem to recognize fear, happiness, sadness, anger, disgust, and contempt with some also including interest, guilt and surprise (Jahr 2000: 23–4). For example, Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989) mention happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust, and Ekman's (1999a) list includes as possible basic emotions amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness, satisfaction, (sensory) pleasure, and shame. Adding interest, surprise, desire, love and sympathy which have also been listed by some researchers (for example Ekman 1992, Anderson & Leaper 1998: 426, Kövescs 2000: 4, Oatley *et al.* 2006: 93, Milton 2005: 33), the emotion terms referring to these emotional responses can certainly all be classified with the help of the modified affect framework, as visualized in Table 5.16.¹² (In this table, **bold face** + underlining signals that these are recognized by all, **bold face** alone signals that these are recognized by many – according to Turner & Stets (2005: 13).

It is interesting that no basic emotion terms can be found in the security sub-category. Presumably, the emotional states that are referred to

Table 5.16 Affect types and basic emotions

un/happiness	happiness	happiness, pride, contentment, relief (<i>cheer</i>) love, sympathy (<i>affection</i>)
	unhappiness	sadness, guilt, shame (<i>miser</i>) contempt (<i>antipathy</i>)
in/security	security	
	insecurity	embarrassment, fear (<i>disquiet</i>)
dis/satisfaction	satisfaction	interest, excitement (<i>interest</i>) pleasure, satisfaction, amusement (<i>pleasure</i>)
	dissatisfaction	anger, disgust (<i>displeasure</i>)
dis/inclination	desire	desire
	non-desire	
surprise	surprise	surprise

with security terms (*confident, together, assured, trusting, comfortable*) are not considered as emotions by psychologists – perhaps indicating another borderline area of affect. But it is promising that basic emotions can be found in each of the five types of affect suggested here: un/happiness, in/security, dis/satisfaction, dis/inclination and surprise.

A brief summary. Before making some more detailed remarks on methodology, let me briefly summarize what I have said above: I have proposed a fuzzy system of affect, with five major sets of emotions, distinguished in their more 'core' or less 'core' membership: un/happiness, in/security, dis/satisfaction, dis/inclination and surprise. I have also suggested that emotions and terms referring to them can be classified as positive, negative or neutral (compare also Storm & Storm 1987: 810, Nöth 1992: 82, Schrauf & Sanchez 2004: 273), and that dis/inclination and surprise are not culturally construed as positive or negative. Further, I have also talked about different ways of portraying emotion.

Let's modify our definition of affect accordingly (in analogy to Martin & White 2005: 42). Affect is concerned with registering feelings: do we desire something or not, do we feel happy or sad, confident or anxious, interested or bored, surprised or unsurprised? These feelings are usually construed as positive (*happy*) or negative (*sad*) in Western culture. Some emotions, however, seem relatively 'neutral' in terms of this cultural evaluation, for instance surprise and desire. The portrayal of emotion (affect) can be more or less indirect: we can label emotions directly, refer to para-/extralinguistic symptoms of emotions, eliciting conditions, caused behaviour, and so on, because emotion terms evoke complex knowledge structures (schemas) that speakers associate with particular emotions.

Table 5.17 sums up the modifications of the affect system established so far. More research is needed on the relation between, and the interaction

Table 5.17 Modifications of affect system

Valence	Description of emotional response	Trigger	Emotion type
positive	emoters' emotions	realis	in/security
	emoters' psycho-physiological expressions of emotion	irrealis	dis/satisfaction
neutral	emoters' emotional language		un/happiness
	emoters' actions or behaviour		dis/inclination
negative	causes of emoters' emotions		surprise

of, these factors. For instance, the question of whether the trigger is *realis* or *irrealis* is only relevant if a trigger is present in the first place, and *dis/inclination* is one type of emotion which allows only an *irrealis* trigger. There is, then, a definite interaction between affect type, direction and trigger, as shown in Figure 5.8. Figure 5.8 shows that *dis/inclination* needs a trigger (Martin & White 2005: 48), and that this trigger is always *irrealis* (I-T), and also describes the fact that *realis/irrealis* depends on the presence of a trigger.




Figure 5.8 Interaction between affect type, direction and trigger

5.3.2.3 Analysis of affect types

The classificatory grid that was used to categorize affect types in the BRC baby (Chapter 6) is the modified system of five affect types that was just introduced. In order to simplify the analysis, no double codings (for *emotion blends*, see above, and Shaver *et al.* 1987: 1082) were undertaken; in each problematic case, one emotion only was given preference. Table 5.18 lists the relevant affect categories on the left, with their definitions (that is, typical emotions in a particular category), and the emotion terms analyzed as belonging to a certain affect category to the right. This is a complete list of all (covert and overt) emotion terms analyzed in the BRC baby.¹³

Table 5.18 Emotion terms analyzed in the BRC baby

Affect type	Typical emotions	Emotion terms
dis/inclination	'wishes, willingness, volition'	appetite for, aspire to, care to, coveted, deliberate, deliberately, desirable, the desire (to), desire (V), desired, desperate for, eager to, eagerly, enviable, envious, fancy, happy (for) to, hopeful, hopefully, hope that (V), the hope (that), jealousy, long to, had a mind to, miss, nostalgic, nostalgic affection, prefer (to), readily, seductive, felt tempted to, tempt, wanna/want, will/would (V), the will to do sth, willing to, willingly, wish (N), wish (V), would/'d like, 'd rather, yearning
non-desire	'reluctance, unwillingness, non-volition'	disinclined, involuntary, refuse to (not refuse an offer), refusal to, reluctant, reluctantly, reluctance to, unwilling to
in/security		
security: trust	'trust in someone or in a future happening'	confident about, optimism that, optimistic, trusted
insecurity: distrust	'distrust, reserve, suspicion'	doubtfully, emotional withdrawing, reserve, suspicious of, suspicion about
security: quiet	'assurance, confidence, ease, safety, relaxation'	assured, blithely, confident, confidence, comfortable with, comforting, the ease, at ease with, reassuring, reassurance, relax, feel safe, solace, unashamed, untroubled

(Continued)

dis/satisfaction: displeasure	'anger, frustration, dissatisfaction'	anger, anger (V), angry, annoyed at, bothered, discontent, fed up with, frustration, furious, grudge against, impatience at, hate, irritated, irritably, maddeningly, mind (V), outrage, resignedly, spite (V), held on to his temper, unsatisfactory, vexing	un/happiness
happiness: affection	'like, love, respect, pity'	affection, beloved, care for, cherish, devotion, fond of, be into sth, keen on, like (to), loving, his love's, love (N), love (V), much-loved, pity for, pitiful, respectful, reverently, taken with, warmth, warmly, a weakness for	unhappiness: antipathy
happiness: cheer	'amusement, cheer, happiness'	amusement, amused at, brightening, cheerfulness, cheered by, cheery, glad of/that, happy, happiest, happily, jovial, merry	unhappiness: misery
surprise	'surprise'	amazing, amazingly, astounded, shocked, shock, shock of, shocking, staggered, start, surprised, surprisng, surprisingly, surprise	surprise

Table 5.18 (Continued)

Affect type	Typical emotions	Emotion terms
insecurity: disquiet	'fear, worry, anxiety, puzzlement, confusion, embarrassment'	a/raid of, agitation, alarm, anxiety, anxiously, feels destabilised, disconcerting, distress, embarrass, fear (V), fear of/that, fearful, frighten (V), frightened, frightening, horror, intimidated by, intimidation, overawed, puzzled, puzzling, perplexing, rattled, self-conscious, self-consciously, scared of, terrified, troubled by, unnerve, unsettled, upset, worried, worrying, worry about (V), worries about (N)
dis/satisfaction		
satisfaction: interest	'interest in, fascination with, excitement, entertainment'	arresting, went berserk, care about (V), carried away, curious, drawn to, engaging, entertaining, as entertainers, enthusiasm for, exhilarating, excited, exciting, fanatical about, fascinating, fascination with, frenzy, interest (V), interested in, interesting, interestingly, interest (N), magnetised by, spellbound, stirring, thrilling
dissatisfaction: ennui	'boredom'	boring
satisfaction: pleasure	'admiration, appeal, contentment, gratitude, being impressed, pleasure, pride'	admirable, admirable, admiring, the appeal of, appealing, appreciate, appreciative, appreciation, content with, (feelings of) contentment, enjoy, ¹⁵ entrance, gratitude, impressed, pleased, please, pleasing, proudly, proud, satisfaction, satisfying, satisfied with, thankful

5.3.3 Covert vs. overt affect

The distinction that was made in Section 3.3.4 between overt and covert affect was also applied to the manual text analysis. In addition to the patterns noted in Section 3.3.4 with count usages of certain emotion nouns (for example *It BE a surprise/disappointment/appeal of*), and certain *surprise/disappointment, the surprise/disappointment/appeal of*), and certain emotion nouns used as pre-modifier (for example *surprise decision, hate figure*), further noun usages as well as certain adjectives and adverbs are included as covert affect, whenever they do not label an emoter's emotional response as such but rather refer to events, things, situations and so on that (have the power to) trigger an emotional response. This concerns the use of adjectives such as *amazing, disappointing*,¹⁶ adverbs such as *amazingly, disappointingly* (as stance adverbial/modal comment adjunct rather than circumstance adverbial/circumstance of quality), and nouns such as *appeal, concern, disappointment, frenzy* in certain patterns (*the frenzy of, be of concern* and so on). Thus:

covert affect: *It was amazing; happily, he missed; he was a disappointment*
overt affect: *I was amazed; he smiled happily; to our great disappointment. . .*

Table 5.19 lists emotion terms that were coded as covert affect.

Table 5.19 Analysis of covert affect in the BRC baby

Coded as 'covert affect'	Adj	Adv	N
	<i>admirable, amazing, anxious (moments), appealing, arresting, boring, comforting, confusing, covered, daunting, depressing, desirable, disappointing, disconcerting, engaging, entertaining, enviable, exhilarating, exciting, fearful, frightening, happy (living spaces/days), haunting, interesting, intimidating, jovial (retort), loving (family support), moving, painful, perplexing, pleasing, puzzling, reassuring, (a) respectful (distance), sad (events/day), satisfying, seductive, shocking, sick-making, stirring, surprising, thrilling, unashamed, unsatisfactory, vexing, worrying</i>	<i>amazingly, dauntingly, disappointingly, happily, hopefully, interestingly, maddeningly, pitifully, sadly, surprisingly</i>	<i>the appeal of, X's concern was/is, be of concern, (a big) disappointment, the sense of ease conveyed by, as entertainers, my greatest fear, the frenzy of, her horror is, his love's, the shock of, a surprise</i>

Table 5.20 Analysis of valence in the BRC baby

negative	positive	neutral/ambiguous
<i>alarm, agitation, agony, anguish, anger/angry, annoyed, anxiety/anxious/ly, boring, bother/bothered, can't bear/stand, concern/concerned, confusing, dauntingly/daunting, dejection, depressing/depressed, destabilised, disappointing/disappointing, disconcerting, disconcerting, disdain, dislike, distress, embarrassment, fed up, fearful, frightening/frightening/frightened/fear/afraid, frustration, furious, gone off, grief, grudge, hate, horror/horrible, impatience, intimidation/intimidating/intimidated, hate, irritably, irritated, jealousy, loathe, let down, maddeningly, malaise, melancholy/melancholic, miserable, miss, outrage, painful, perplexing, rattled, regret/regretful, resent, sadly/sad, scared, scornful/scorn, self-conscious/ly, shock/shocked, shocking, sick-making, sorrow, spite, sullen, suspicion/suspicious, temper, terrified, tormented, troubled, unhappy, unsatisfactory, unsettled, unnerve, upset, vexing, worked up, worry/worrying, wretched</i>	<i>appealing/appeal, appreciative/appreciate/appreciation, affection, admirable/admirable/admire, amused, assured/reassuring/reassurances, blithe/ly, brightening, cheered/cheerfulness/cheer/cheerfully, cherish, comfortable/comforting, confidence/confident, content/contentment, covered, desirable, devotion, ease, enjoy, engaging, entertaining/entertainers, enthusiasm, entrancing, enviable, exciting, exhilarating, fond of, glad, gratitude, happy/happily, hopefully/hope, impressed, be into, jovial, keen on (so), like, love/loving/beloved/much-loved, merry, optimism/optimistic, pity, pleased/please/pleasing, proudly, relax, respectful, reverently, feel safe, satisfaction/satisfying/satisfied, solace, soulfully, taken with, thankful, trust, untroubled, warmth/warmly</i>	<i>'desire': desire, involuntary, deliberately, yearning, want, fancy, happy to, seductive, wishes, aspire, wish, willing, will, unwilling, desired, eagerly, readily, keen, refused/refusal, to, reluctant/reluctance, disinclined, appetite for, would like, long, care for/about/to, desperate (to/for), prefer to, had a mind to, disinclined, tempted, I'd rather</i> <i>'interest': interest in/interesting, fascinated/fascination with, magnetised by, fascinated about, (being) drawn to, carried away by, excited/ly, arresting, stirring, thrilling, frenzy, curious</i> <i>Other: pitifully, overawe, haunting, unashamed, doubtfully, resignedly, sorry, berserk, weakness for, puzzled/puzzling, nostalgic, reserve, emotional withdrawing, moving, mind</i>

5.3.4 Valence

Valence concerns the coding of emotion terms as positive, negative or neutral/ambiguous, as discussed in Section 5.3.2.1 above. For the text analysis, a general classification scheme was adopted which regards most emotion terms relating to 'interest', 'surprise' and 'desire' as neutral/ambiguous. Exceptions are for example *hope* (coded as positive) and *shock* (coded as negative). Where the valence was neither clear nor strong, a coding of the emotion term as neutral/ambiguous was also preferred. Again, though there may be some debate about the coding of individual emotion terms, the analysis was consistent and is outlined in Table 5.20 (on p. 177) to ensure transparency (compare also Appendix A 2.4 online).

While this chapter was mainly concerned with outlining the theoretical and methodological background to the text analysis, Chapter 6 will report the results of analyzing affect according to these and other factors.

Notes

1. See for example, Ortony *et al.* (1988), Robinson (2005: 8–27). Confusingly for linguists perhaps, this process is called *appraisal* (for example Ellsworth & Scherer 2003). The hypothesis is that 'for events to prompt emotions, they must be evaluated, or appraised, in relation to the individual's goals' (Ortony *et al.* 2006: 167). This can be an unconscious or potentially conscious process (primary vs. secondary appraisal) (Ortony *et al.* 2006: 167). As the authors put it, '[i]f we know what appraisals (or evaluations) are made we can predict the emotion; if we know what the emotion is we can infer the appraisals' (Ortony *et al.* 2006: 21).
2. Action readiness items are, for example, 'I wanted to oppose, to assault, hurt, or insult' (for antagonism), 'I felt inhibited, paralyzed, or frozen' (for inhibition), 'I wanted to do something, but I did not know what' (for helplessness) (Ortony *et al.* 2006: 132; more examples in Fridja *et al.* 1995: 129). In the following, I will include these as actions without differentiating between action readiness and actions.
3. Schema theory suggests that our knowledge of the world is organized in terms of mental knowledge structures which capture the typical features of the world (for an overview see Bednarek 2005a). They are part of our semantic memory, and usually shared by members of the same linguistic community (they are more or less conventionalized but can vary cross-culturally or among sub-cultures) and can refer to both more or less factual knowledge (spiders usually have eight legs), and to scientifically wrong folk beliefs (spiders are insects). Concerning the structure of schemas, they are often assumed to consist of categories and the specific interrelations (for example X has a Y, X is on Y, X is a part of Y) existing between them, the categories providing default assignments (by supplying prototypes) and associated expectations (Ungerer & Schmid 1996: 212–13). In Kövecses's terms,

'[f]olk understandings can be thought of as knowledge structures in our conceptual system' (Kövecses 2000: 114). This knowledge is presumably based on our experience of actual emotional responses (for example increased body heat when angry), and observing them in others, as well as exposure to discourse on emotions and other socialization mechanisms. That is, I want to follow Kövecses's suggestion that emotion schemas are *both* motivated by human physiology *and* produced by the socio-cultural environment (Kövecses 2000: 14). Folk knowledge also has to do with *feeling rules* (Section 1.3). Related to this, *emotional intelligence* involves knowledge of more than emotion schemas, and has been used to refer to differences in:

communicative skills ..., including discerning others' emotions, realizing that expressions and experience do not necessarily match, knowing the cultural rules for displaying emotion, using the emotional vocabulary, feeling empathy, recognizing that your own expressions affect others, and using all of these skills in relationships with others. (Planalp 1999: 70)

4. To this we might perhaps need to add ways that show '*the way the world appears to a person in that emotional state*' (Robinson 2005: 275, italics in original).
5. With respect to a proposed cline of implicitness or indirectness, we can say that this depends on how strongly an action, behaviour and so on is associated with an emotion, and how prototypical it is for an emotion. The stronger the association, and the more prototypical the action, behaviour and so on, the less inferencing is perhaps involved. For instance, if a strong causal relation exists, inferences are more easily drawn (O'Halloran 2003: 141) so that 'various aspects of a scenario [schema] may be differentially accessible at various points in processing' (O'Halloran 2003: 188, citing Sanford & Garrod 1994: 704).
6. The remaining four variables are hypotheticality, negation, part of speech, and speech act – a complete guide to the analysis with respect to all nine variables is provided in Appendix A 6.2 online.
7. I am neither a semanticist nor a lexicographer by training, but presumably, the analysis of such a semantic field should involve thorough corpus-based lexicographic, semantic and discourse analytic studies of these terms, perhaps complemented by a native speaker survey. Since more than 1000 emotion terms can be identified, this is well beyond the scope of this book (for an attempt of a taxonomy of emotion vocabulary based on elicited data, see Storm & Storm 1987). Nevertheless, I agree with Martin & White that 'there is a need to develop social semiotic principles for classifying lexis' (Martin & White 2005: 58). There are of course existing alternatives to Martin & White's classification of emotion terms, for example the classification of emotion and related terms adopted by the *Encarta Thesaurus* (see Section 1.6.3) or Wierzbicka (1999: 49). In terms of folk classifications, Ortony *et al.* report that people asked to sort emotion terms into categories use love, joy, surprise, anger, sadness, and fear at the basic level (Ortony *et al.* 2006: 182) and Fillenbaum and Rapoport (1971: 100–24) are interested in subjects' similarity ratings of emotion terms. Mees (2006), looking at

German emotion terms, classifies them as denoting *ereignisfundierte Emotionen* ('event-based'), *Attributions-Emotionen* ('attribution-based'), *Beziehungs-Emotionen* ('relationship-based'), and *Verbindungs-Emotionen* ('connection-based'). Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989: 96), on the basis of a specific theory of emotion, classify emotion terms as denoting generic emotions (*feelings*), basic emotions (*happiness*), emotional relations (*love*), caused emotions (*gladness*), causatives (*reassurance*), emotional goals (*desire*) and complex emotions (*embarrassment*). Ortony *et al.* (1987) also offer a taxonomy of 500 emotion terms. However, these are psychologists' classifications which are mostly intuition-based and do not use corpus or discourse data. As pointed out earlier, I also believe that we need to draw a clear dividing line between classifying *emotions* and classifying *emotion terms*. Different kinds of emotions have been defined as event-triggered (interest, excitement, surprise, fear), state-triggered (happiness, distress) or action-triggered (pride, shame, guilt) (Izard 1977, in Daneš 2004; compare also Fiebler 1990: 47). Similarly, Ortony *et al.* (1988: 14) differentiate between Event-based emotions (related to goals), Attribution emotions (related to agents and standards of behaviour), and Attraction emotions (related to attitudes). Emotions can also be distinguished with reference to goal achievement (Ekman 1999a: 2). Such classifications are problematic for linguistic purposes since expressions such as *I am angry* can be used for describing emotions about actions, situations or persons (Daneš 2004: 28 and Chapter 4 above). Compare also the overviews given in Jahr (2000: 23), Daneš (2004: 30–1), and Turner & Stets (2005: 289) on descriptions of different types of emotions.

8. The assumption that surprise is not construed as a negative emotion is also confirmed by the classification of experimental subjects of surprise terms as positive rather than negative (Wallace & Carson 1973: 16), as well as by semantic change (*amazing* meaning 'very surprising, especially in a way that makes you feel *pleasure* or *admiration*', *OALD*, emphasis mine). Note also that there are both lexical items that conflate unexpectedness and positive evaluation (*miraculous*) and items that conflate unexpectedness and negative evaluation (*alarming*) (Lemke 1998).

9. This is perhaps the case because the mental state of surprise has a problematic status in emotion research (Ungerer 1997: 326, Robinson 2005: 64). For example, Daneš (2004: 27) lists surprise as a neutral emotion, Johnson-Laird & Oakley (1989: 102) classify it as a reaction rather than a distinct emotion, and others include it only as emotion if it involves an evaluative specification (Jahr 2000: 26). Ekman suggests that surprise might be 'perceived differently than other emotions' (Ekman 1992: 176). While most emotion theorists seem to include surprise (Ortony *et al.* 1988: 32), this depends on the particular theory of emotion involved. For example, Ortony *et al.* (1988) claim that emotion is only related to positive-negative appraisal, and therefore excludes neutral surprise (since this is related only to an appraisal of unexpectedness). Reasons for including surprise as an emotion in psychological research are that, like other emotions (see below):

- it is based on a cognitive evaluation of the environment;
- it has associated typical actions/behaviour;
- it has an associated physiological response;

• it has an associated facial expression (for an illustration of this see (<http://www.woodstock.edu/myers6e/content/psychsim/>), last accessed 12 October 2006).

For appraisal theory, whether or not psychologists consider surprise as an emotion is only one of the considerations to be taken into account, another might be whether speakers consider surprise terms as being emotion terms or not. In experiments where subjects had to free-list emotion terms, surprise terms were in fact not core members of the emotion category (Shaver *et al.* 1987), but arguably still members. If we assume that the field of emotion terms has no clear boundaries, and that emotion terms 'designate fuzzy sets' (Shaver *et al.* 1987: 1063), feelings involving surprise, like dis/satisfaction (see above), are on the borders of 'true' affect but can still be included in the affect system.

10. Let me make a more general point: it seems necessary to make a distinction between positivity/negativity in terms of cultural construal vs. positivity/negativity in terms of the evaluation that can be implied by using an emotion term. For instance, I may use an expression denoting surprise to evaluate someone negatively or positively (Bednarek 2006b), but this does not necessarily mean that the surprise felt by the emoter is construed as positive or negative. Furthermore, there is no automatic correlation between positive emotions and positive evaluation: to refer to an emoter's positive emotional reaction (for example *delight*) to a trigger that is evaluated negatively by the writer/speaker may result in a negative evaluation of the emoter, rather than a positive one (Bednarek 2006a: 210). This might constitute a problem for computational linguistics when a seed list is used with emotion terms that are tagged as 'positive' or 'negative', in order to analyze automatically the type of evaluation in texts (for computational linguistic approaches to appraisal see Taboada & Grivee 2004, Whitelaw *et al.* 2005, Bloom *et al.* 2007).

11. There are at least three different ways in which the term *basic* is used in emotion research (Ekman 1992: 170, Kövecses 2000: 3). Different criteria for basic emotions are given by Johnson-Laird & Oatley (1989), Ekman (1992: 175–89), and Jahr (2000: 24), and include the presence of distinctive universal signals (for example, facial expression), the existence of the given emotion in other primates, a quick onset of the emotion and a brief duration (Ekman 1992, 1999a). For some researchers a basic emotion is not a distinct emotional state but rather 'an emotion family [which] can be considered to constitute a theme and variations' (Ekman 1999a: 8). Similarly, Johnson-Laird & Oatley point out that '[a]round each mode [happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust], there may cluster a family of related emotional experiences' (Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989: 85).

12. It is of course problematic that emotion research uses English words to classify emotional states (compare Wierzbicka 1992a, b, 1998, 1999). Wierzbicka instead proposes to use a language made up of universal semantic primitives for their description. As Athanasiadou & Tabakowska explain: 'if there are some innate and universal cognitive scenarios which play a special role in human lives all over the world, such scenarios would have to be identified via such lexical universals, and not via culture-specific words such as *sadness* or *anger*' (Athanasiadou & Tabakowska 1998b: xiv). Wierzbicka (1999:

Chapter 2) gives an analysis of about fifty emotion concepts in English and their underlying cognitive scenarios in terms of semantic primitives (but not based on large-scale corpus linguistics).

13. Word combinations such as *nostalgic affection*, *preferential love*, *compassionate love* were coded as one emotion (nostalgia, love) rather than two.
14. In contrast to Martin (2000a: 153) I classify *enjoy* as satisfaction: pleasure rather than happiness: affection, since enjoying something means that something gives you pleasure, and seems to be goal-related (which is what dis/satisfaction is about, see Martin & White 2005: 49). Vice versa, I classify *respect* as happiness: affection rather than dis/satisfaction (Martin & White 2005: 49), since it seems to me not related to the pursuit of goals but rather to affection/liking. It must be noted that there is some overlap between dis/satisfaction and un/happiness.
15. I coded *I'm/I am sorry* only as unhappiness: misery; the general, conventional use of *sorry* was excluded from affect, since its emotional meaning is bleached.
16. These are classified by appraisal theory as appreciation: reaction rather than affect (White 2001: 3, White 2002: 16, Martin & White 2005: 57–8), but, as I have argued elsewhere (Bednarek forthcoming 2008), they constitute a 'bridge' between appreciation/judgement and affect, and imply emotional responses, which is why they were included as covert affect.

6 Enacting Affect: Pragmatic Analysis

As proposed, the large-scale studies of Chapters 2 to 4 are complemented by a brief foray into the pragmatics of emotion talk in the BRC baby using a modified version of appraisal theory and the methodology described in Chapter 5 (also in Appendix A 6.2 online). The 85,000 words of the BRC baby were manually analyzed for all listed variables, but because of space constraints only extracts are included in this chapter. Such a small-scale analysis allows us to make safer guesses about the pragmatics of emotion talk in the four registers than are possible using large-scale analysis, but is less representative. (The small-scale analyses are necessary because it takes time to analyze texts manually according to the methodology outlined in Chapter 5.) No detailed, 'truly' qualitative analyses of each of the roughly 60 texts in the BRC baby were undertaken, which would take into account textual development, or *logogenesis* (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 43) and social context, though an extended extract from fiction will be commented upon. This is because there are already many such qualitative analyses using the appraisal framework (see Section 5.1 for references). The aim of this chapter is thus to open up research by pointing to future fields of study, showing opportunities for new research projects, and laying out a 'road-map' for further research into affect. More specifically, this chapter discusses the notions of affective key and stance before outlining some typical functions of emotion terms.

6.1 Affective key and stance

Much research has shown that affect clusters or patterns in text. This has been discussed as 'prosody' in appraisal theory (Macken-Horarik 2003b, Martin & White 2005: 19–23; on 'emotive prosody' from a non-SFL