

4 A new theory of evaluation

4.1 The parameter-based framework of evaluation

This chapter introduces the main features of a new, parameter-based theory of evaluation, which is based on the assumption that there are different parameters along which speakers can evaluate aspects of the world. This approach is hence very much a *combining* approach (Chapter 3). After all, what speakers are talking about can be evaluated in relation to a wide range of norms: do we feel that what we are talking about is 'good news' or 'bad news', do we evaluate the information we have as reliable or unreliable, is what we are talking about presented as expected or unexpected, obvious or surprising, important or unimportant, appropriate or inappropriate, etc.? In my view, these questions are all related to the phenomenon of evaluation. In other words, to employ a parameter-based framework of evaluation is not meant to imply that what we are concerned with are separate phenomena; it is still *one* phenomenon, that of evaluation, that is examined.

I suggest that there are (*at least*) nine parameters along which speakers can evaluate aspects of the world – though these parameters are rather different in kind (see below). Each of the proposed parameters involves a different dimension along which the evaluation proceeds, and includes what I call *sub-values*, which either refer to the different poles on the respective evaluative scale (core evaluative parameters) or to different types of the parameter (peripheral evaluative parameters) (Figure 4.1).

This framework of evaluation aims at a synthesis of the various parameter-based approaches introduced in Chapter 3 in a variety of ways (see Appendix 2).

On the one hand, it takes into account basic *similarities* between evaluations, for instance between those that indicate different degrees of RELIABILITY (e.g. Biber and Finegan's *maybe* and *surely* adverbials) or those that all involve writer approval/disapproval (e.g. Francis's rationality, value, appropriacy). On the other hand, it also acknowledges basic *differences* between evaluations, for instance between evaluations of IMPORTANCE, EXPECTEDNESS, COMPREHENSIBILITY and EMOTIVITY, which are sometimes

PARAMETER	VALUES: examples
Core evaluative parameters:	
COMPREHENSIBILITY	COMPREHENSIBLE: <i>plain, clear</i> INCOMPREHENSIBLE: <i>mysterious, unclear</i>
EMOTIVITY	POSITIVE: <i>a polished speech</i> NEGATIVE: <i>a rant</i>
EXPECTEDNESS	EXPECTED: <i>familiar, inevitably</i> UNEXPECTED: <i>astounding, surprising</i>
IMPORTANCE	CONTRAST: <i>but, however</i> CONTRAST/COMPARISON: <i>not, no, hardly, only (negation)</i> IMPORTANT: <i>key, top, landmark</i> UNIMPORTANT: <i>minor, slightly</i>
POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY	NECESSARY: <i>had to</i> NOT NECESSARY: <i>need not</i> POSSIBLE: <i>could</i> NOT POSSIBLE: <i>inability, could not</i>
RELIABILITY	GENUINE: <i>real</i> FAKE: <i>choreographed</i> HIGH: <i>will, be to</i> MEDIUM: <i>likely</i> LOW: <i>may</i>
Peripheral evaluative parameters:	
EVIDENTIALITY	HEARSAY: <i>[he said it was] 'a lie'</i> MINDSAY: <i>'well done' [he thought]</i> PERCEPTION: <i>seem, visibly, betray</i> GENERAL KNOWLEDGE: <i>(in)famously</i> EVIDENCE: <i>proof that</i> UNSPECIFIC: <i>it emerged that, meaning that</i>
MENTAL STATE	BELIEF/DISBELIEF: <i>accept, doubt</i> EMOTION: <i>scared, angry</i> EXPECTATION: <i>expectations</i> KNOWLEDGE: <i>know, recognize</i> STATE-OF-MIND: <i>alert, tired, confused</i> PROCESS: <i>forget, ponder</i> VOLITION/NON-VOLITION: <i>deliberately, forced to</i>
STYLE	SELF: <i>frankly, briefly</i> OTHER: <i>promise, threaten</i>

Figure 4.1 Parameters of evaluation

disregarded (e.g. Biber and Finegan 1988, Conrad and Biber 2000, appraisal theory). Evaluating something as important, comprehensible or expected is fundamentally different from evaluating it as good or bad (even

though the respective evaluations may 'evoke' positive or negative evaluation). If something is important, comprehensible, or expected this is not automatically good. For instance, if *an important omission* is mentioned in a book review this is usually regarded as bad (I am indebted to Nick Groom for pointing out this example). Or consider the following examples where a behaviour is evaluated as expected and bad:

- She threw her hands into the air. 'That is just *typical* of you, isn't it?' (COBUILD, emphasis mine)
- 'Typical!' Hattie slammed down the receiver. 'Absolutely *typical*!' (COBUILD, emphasis mine)

In academic English, too, evaluations of EXPECTEDNESS can be used to evoke positive evaluation (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 25) as well as negative evaluation – compare the use of phrases such as *Surprisingly* ... and *This is in line with findings by* ... – and can also be employed more or less neutrally:

- The starting point of this chapter is probably *unexpected* – it is that most actual examples are unrepresentative of the pattern of the word or phrase for which they are chosen (Sinclair 1991: 99, emphasis mine). → more neutral
- The classic reference for corpus word-class tagging is Johansson (1986), *strangely* overlooked in Garside *et al.* (op. cit.) (Sinclair 1998, emphasis mine). → more negative

Similarly, evaluating something as expected is different from evaluating it as obvious (contrast Thompson and Hunston's parameter of obviousness/expectedness). Expressions such as **CURIOUSLY**, **FUNNILY**, **STRANGELY**, **UNEXPECTEDLY**, **ODDLY ENOUGH**, **SURPRISINGLY**, **SURPRISINGLY** all primarily seem to denote EXPECTEDNESS rather than obviousness, whereas expressions like **OBVIOUSLY**, **EVIDENTLY** and **APPARENTLY** all make reference to the kind of *evidence* a speaker has for drawing a certain conclusion and primarily involve another dimension, namely that of **EVIDENTIALITY**.

Furthermore, the framework also takes into account non-combining approaches to evaluation, specifically research into evidentiality and develops this as a parameter of evaluation with various sub-types. Additionally, it encompasses all kinds of evaluation that have so far been identified in research,¹ including **STYLE** (only proposed by research into stance), **MENTAL STATE** (partly proposed by appraisal theory in Affect) and **POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY** (only proposed by Lemke).

The framework adopted here is also broader than some of the above-mentioned in that it includes not only evaluations of propositions (as e.g. in Francis 1995) but evaluations concerning all kinds of aspects: participants, processes, circumstances, events, actions, entities, states of affairs, situations, discourse, etc.; in short, everything that *can* be evaluated. The linguistic means that are used for evaluations are called *evaluators*, following

Lemke (1998), who defines them as 'lexicographically segmentable elements of a text which function, as a whole, to evaluate' (Lemke 1998: 41) along one or more of the evaluative parameters established above.

The central question is whether these parameters are in general exhaustive. As far as the corpus at hand is concerned, this seems to be the case. However, research into different genres might point to additional parameters of evaluation. The parameter-based framework of evaluation is hence to be regarded as an *open-ended* approach, and in its present form allows the simple addition of more parameters as research into evaluation progresses. Both this open-endedness, and the fact that the parameters, as we will see below, can be *combined* in order to express complex evaluations, give this approach much more flexibility than competing notions such as stance and appraisal.

4.2 Core evaluative parameters

An important distinction that has so far only been touched upon is the difference between what might be called *core* and *peripheral* evaluative parameters.² Core evaluative parameters relate to evaluative qualities ascribed to the entities, situations or propositions that are evaluated, and involve evaluative scales with two poles, but also potential intermediate stages between them (on the scalar nature of evaluation cf. also Hunston 1993, Lemke 1998, Malrieu 1999). As a consequence, evaluative meanings can be located on a cline of low to high force/intensity. On the one hand, this is sometimes directly reflected in the language in that we find expressions of different 'intensity' such as: *good-great-brilliant/bad-horrible-disastrous* (EMOTIVITY), *unexpectedly-surprisingly-astonishingly* (EXPECTEDNESS), *important-vital* (IMPORTANCE), *allowed-supposed-required* (POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY), *possible-probable-certain* (RELIABILITY). In appraisal theory, this is called 'implicit scaling for intensity' (White 2001a: 26). On the other hand, intensifying and focusing adverbs (*slightly, somewhat, rather, really, very, completely*, etc.) as well as other intensifying expressions (e.g. *a great deal of*) can be used to express different degrees of the concepts involved, as in, for example, *it's incomprehensible – it's completely incomprehensible*. This notion of scaling is related to the concepts of emphasis, intensity and Graduation and is regarded as a dimension of affect (Janney 1996) and appraisal (Martin 2000). However, 'scaling for intensity provides for a broad semantic which operates *trans-systematically*' (White 2001a: 28, emphasis mine); it 'can be seen as an interpersonal coloration or tonality across the APPRAISAL [here: evaluation] system' (White 1998: 109). Intensity is thus *not* considered as a 'parameter' of evaluation in the framework adopted here, but rather as a *modulator* of evaluation. Moreover, there is no appropriate methodology available for identifying the exact position of an evaluator on an evaluative scale. (This is why, in the empirical analysis, the evaluators are classified as belonging to one of the two *poles* on the scale (e.g. as POSITIVE or NEGATIVE) rather than categorizing them according to their evaluative

intensity. For these reasons I will not examine the occurrence of intensity systematically in the corpus, but rather note it wherever it seems particularly significant. A disadvantage of this approach is that the distinction of evaluators in terms of intensity could be potentially very interesting where the tabloid-broadsheet distinction is concerned. Only with RELIABILITY was it possible to distinguish between *three* positions on the scale: LOW, MEDIUM and HIGH.)

The following parameters can arguably be regarded as core evaluative parameters: COMPREHENSIBILITY, EMOTIVITY, EXPECTEDNESS, IMPORTANCE, POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY and RELIABILITY, though more research is necessary into the parameters of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY and RELIABILITY to ascertain their status. I shall now comment on these parameters in turn, outlining some of the theoretical and methodological aspects involved in their establishment.

Evaluations of COMPREHENSIBILITY have to do with the extent to which writers evaluate entities, situations or propositions as being within or beyond the grasp of human understanding. COMPREHENSIBILITY is treated as a broad notion comprising the related concepts of vagueness and explicitness (what is vague is less easily comprehensible, what is explicit is more easily comprehensible), expressed, for example, by *ambiguously, vague, complex*. It also includes the concepts of mental 'clarity' (e.g. *clarify, unclear*), inexplicability, and mystery, together with unsolved problems as well as states of affairs which are unknown to us, and which hence remain mysterious (e.g. *uncanny, inconsistencies, questions over, no explanations as to why, mysterious*). Such evaluations are situated on a cline ranging from more or less COMPREHENSIBLE to more or less INCOMPREHENSIBLE:


- *It was unclear* [COMPREHENSIBILITY: INCOMPREHENSIBLE] last night why Mr Burrell, 45, failed to make the letter available to the French judge who investigated the death of Diana and Dodi Fayed in a car crash in a Paris road tunnel in August 1997. (Times 5)
- In the second paragraph of the document, written in October 1996, Diana explained in the *plainest* [COMPREHENSIBILITY: COMPREHENSIBLE] possible language that she was convinced of the plot to mastermind an accident. (Mirror 5)

The parameter of EMOTIVITY is concerned with the writer's evaluation of aspects of events as good or bad, i.e. with the expression of writer approval or disapproval. Evaluations of EMOTIVITY are situated on a cline ranging from more or less POSITIVE (POLISHED, STOUTLY) to more or less NEGATIVE (FANATIC, PERVERSE).

- They *showered 'em* [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE]: Iain Duncan Smith with wife Betsy after his conference *tour de force* [EMOTIVITY: POSITIVE] (Mail 1)
- But some visibly flinched as he *stooped to* [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] *gutted* [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] politics with *vicious* [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] *personal attacks* [EMOTIVITY: NEGATIVE] on political opponents. (Mirror 1)

In terms of methodology, EMOTIVITY is probably the most problematic of all parameters. Emotive meaning is not easily objectively verifiable or recognizable (there are no standardized procedures to identify such meaning), and its analysis is often highly subjective, even more than that of evaluative meaning in general. The reason for this is that emotive meaning is a very complex phenomenon involving different clines.

Firstly, there is a cline between EMOTIVITY and non-EMOTIVITY: certainly, lexical items such as CONFUSION, KILL, DAMAGE, BOMB, etc. have negative meaning; they have been described as 'disaster vocabulary' (Ungerer 1997: 315), and their paraphrases may even involve evaluative expressions (e.g. DAMAGE: 'To damage something means to cause it to become less good, pleasant, or successful', COBUILD, underlining mine). But if there was a bomb in Iraq and this bomb caused damage and killed people, such 'negative' lexical expressions must be used in the reporting of this event. Mentioning that a bomb killed 100 people in Iraq does not automatically and expressly tell us that the writer disapproves of this event (though this may in general be assumed). Similarly, labels such as OFFENCE or CRIME describe socially defined activities (and are thus highly dependent on society, culture and time), and can be regarded as originating not in the speaker but in 'the institutionalised legal process' (White 1998: 131). Such descriptions and labels are hence not strictly evaluative, although they may evoke an evaluative or emotional (Ungerer 1997) reaction of readers. However, as soon as some marked degree of higher intensity or emotion is involved with such descriptive labels, as in ASSASSIN, MAYHEM or MURDER, lexical expressions do seem to express the writer's opinion and become evaluative – the difficulty is to say when this is the case (cf. also White 1998: 130):




As White (2004a) has shown, there is a large range of variability in emotive expressions, a variability which is crucially dependent on the context in which they occur, and which provides some evidence against assuming a strict dichotomy of explicitness and implicitness. He concludes:

I am proposing, therefore, that rather than making a clear-cut distinction between explicit and implicit evaluation, we work with a notion of degrees of attitudinal saturation. The more limited the semantic variability of the term the more saturated it is, the less limited the semantic variability, the less saturated. (White 2004a: 2f)

For example, the evaluation expressed by lexical items such as DISGRACEFUL, BRUTALLY or SHAM is quite stable compared to that of expressions

such as SINGLE-HANDEDLY, which varies enormously depending on the context. Accordingly, DISGRACEFUL would be considered as more saturated than SINGLE-HANDEDLY (White 2004a). Moreover, implicit evaluations 'are highly subject to reader position – each reader will interpret a text's tokens of judgement according to their own cultural and ideological positioning' (White 2001a: 13). As Martin has pointed out, implicit evaluation 'creates something of a coding nightmare' (Martin 2003: 173) for linguists.

Thirdly, there is a cline regarding the difference of emotive evaluators in terms of intensity or force: to take one example which Thompson and Hunston (2000) mention: 'execution, assassination, killing, murder, and slaughter may all be used to describe the same incident, but the sense of moral outrage increases with each successive noun' (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 17f). To classify evaluators only according to whether they express 'goodness' or 'badness' is thus to falsify the actual discourse semantics to some extent. On the other hand, there is no scientifically valid method (yet) to enable an exact analysis of emotive evaluators, i.e. to put them on a specific position on this cline:



Fourthly, there is a cline in the amount of ideational and interpersonal meaning expressed in an emotive evaluator. This concerns the difference between expressions such as BEAUTIFUL, WRONG, UGLY which are said to be purely interpersonal, and expressions that have ideational as well as interpersonal meaning, such as the much-quoted examples of TERRORIST, GUERRILLA and FREEDOM FIGHTER. Such lexical items have been called 'hybrid' signs (Volek 1987: 28), because they combine both symbolic and indexical meaning (discussed in Lyons 1977: 99ff, Konstantinidou 1997: 86ff).

Fifthly, there is a cline in the degree of speaker involvement of evaluations of EMOTIVITY. Evaluators may refer to states of affairs that are (un)pleasant not for the writer but for someone else. In such cases the writer provides some sort of evaluation, but is not 'affected' (Hunston and Sinclair 2000: 99) by (or involved in) the (un)pleasantness of what is evaluated. For example:

They turned out to be a nuisance for match anglers. (Hunston and Sinclair 2000: 99)

Here it is not clear whether the writer thinks that *they* are a nuisance for him/her as well. Although an evaluation of some kind is expressed I suggest that such cases are ultimately very different from instances where the writer is clearly involved in expressing his/her negative opinion.

Sixthly, there is a cline of 'accessibility to intuition', i.e. a cline concerning the question in how far emotive meanings are accessible to native speaker intuition. For instance, the negative/positive emotive meaning of 'emotionally charged' (Löbner 2002: 34) terms of address such as IDIOT, BASTARD, DARLING, HONEY are easily recognizable to readers, whereas other emotive evaluations are more subtle and less easily identifiable. A case in point is the difference between ASSIST, HELP, INTERFERE, MEDDLE, COLLUDE, COLLABORATE, ENGAGE, JOIN und PARTICIPATE, which are all 'concerned with being involved in something or taking part in an activity' (Francis *et al.* 1996: 198), but differ considerably in their evaluation of this involvement: ASSIST and HELP evaluate the involvement as good, or positive, INTERFERE and MEDDLE evaluate it as bad, or negative and COLLABORATE, ENGAGE, JOIN and PARTICIPATE do not evaluate the involvement at all (Thompson and Hunston 2000: 17). As Stubbs notes, interpretations of emotive connotations often diverge (Stubbs 2001: 153). The problem is that subtle emotive meanings may not be captured in the analysis, precisely because they are not easily recognizable by the researcher. The methodological decisions taken with regards to the classification of EMOTIVITY in view of these complex problems are presented in Chapter 5.

The parameter of EXPECTEDNESS involves the writer's evaluations of aspects of the world (including propositions) as more or less EXPECTED or UNEXPECTED. As with COMPREHENSIBILITY, I have adopted a broad approach to this parameter, and include notions of (un)expectedness in various guises (classified as EXPECTED/UNEXPECTED), such as (counter) expectation (e.g. *astonishing, stunning, unprecedented*), usuality (*unusually, routine*), familiarity (*familiar*), strangeness (*bizarrely, curious*), contrastive/unexpected emphasis (*fully, no fewer than*) and 'actuality' (*as it is, in the event*). These notions are present to greater and lesser degrees in the meanings of the evaluators (which I call *expectationals*) in this group. I also regard CONTRAST (e.g. *but, although*) as well as CONTRAST/COMPARISON (negation) as values of EXPECTEDNESS, while excluding addition signals (e.g. *additionally, also, further*) as well as *and* and *because* (but see Thompson and Hunston: 2000: 9). This is because much research has pointed out that the notions of contrast and concession are linked to expectations. Thus, already in 1934 Bühler notes how ABER is connected to expectation (referring to the example sentence *Er fiel um aber sprang wieder auf/He fell down but jumped up again*):

Ein solches *aber* setzt im Hörer ein Weiterdenken voraus und korrigiert oder bremst; es spricht zum Hörer ungefähr so: 'vielleicht hast du erwartet, daß der Gestürzte liegen blieb? Nein, sondern ...' (Bühler 1934: 409).

This *aber* presupposes the hearer's inferences and corrects them or slows them down; it talks to the hearer, telling him something like: 'perhaps you expected him to remain lying on the ground? No, but ...' (translation mine).

Similarly, Quirk *et al.* (1985) comment in connection with BUT: 'The contrast may be in the *unexpectedness* of what is said in the second conjoin in view of the content of the first conjoin' (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 935, emphasis mine), and in connection with concessive clauses they mention that these 'indicate that the situation in the matrix clause is *contrary to expectation* in the light of what is said in the concessive clause' (Quirk *et al.* 1985: 1098, emphasis mine).

In a similar way, much research suggests that negation – which I regard as expressing both a contrast with and a comparison to an alternative (positive) position (hence the classification as CONTRAST/COMPARISON) – is an important device for expressing evaluation along the parameter of EXPECTEDNESS: 'It has repeatedly been pointed out ... that negation ... is used to reflect the contrast between the expected and the unexpected, between what is assumed to be the case and the unexpected deviation from this assumption' (Bublitz 1992: 567).

Hence, negative statements are generally used to express something unusual, unexpected or unpredictable about a situation and are regarded as indicators of frames or schemas in cognitive linguistics (Tannen 1993, Shanon 1981). The classification of contrast and negation as part of EXPECTEDNESS is also supported by appraisal theory, where contrast is classified as part of counter-expectation, and where both counter-expectation and denial (negation) are considered as expressing the same category (Disclaimer) of Engagement. Similarly, Biber *et al.* comment that '[n]egation and contrast are closely related concepts' (Biber *et al.* 1999: 82) and that both negation and the adversative conjunction BUT are 'devices to deny or counteract the expectations of those involved in dialogue' (Biber *et al.* 1999: 1047). However, both CONTRAST and CONTRAST/COMPARISON could arguably be regarded as *peripheral* rather than *core* evaluative sub-values. Since they are clearly linked to evaluations of unexpectedness, I nevertheless consider them to belong to the core evaluative parameter of EXPECTEDNESS. Examples are:


- The killer blow began when General John de Chastelain, head of the international decommissioning body, delivered an *unexpectedly* [EXPECTEDNESS: UNEXPECTED] brief and vague report on the IRA's latest disarmament. (Mail 6)
- English football has had better weeks. Even by the increasingly outrageous standards of the national side, this week has become a circus. *Little wonder that* [EXPECTEDNESS: EXPECTED] Sven-Göran Eriksson's yearning to return to club management seems to grow with each passing day. (FT 10)
- England manager Sven Goran Eriksson was also said to be seething about the decision. *But* [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST] publicly he would only say that he would have to 'accept orders' and that Ferdinand's exclusion was 'a pity'. (Mail 10)

- Margaret MacDonald, who turned 44 yesterday, was given *no* [EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST/COMPARISON] chance to comment on the sentence which convicted her of 'aggravated procuring for the purposes of prostitution'. (Guardian 8)

Evaluations along the parameter of IMPORTANCE evaluate the world (and discourse about it) according to the speaker's judgement of its status in terms of importance, relevance and significance. As before, I have adopted a broad conceptual approach to the parameter of IMPORTANCE: it includes notions of stardom/famousness (*celeb, famous, celebrity, superstar*), influence/authority (*empire, leading, senior, top*), significance (*significant*), importance (*crucial, crunch, decisive, do-or-die, high-profile, high-rolling, historic, key*), as well as related notions (*climatic, exclusive, hot, showdown, emergency*). In this broad sense, evaluations of IMPORTANCE evaluate aspects of the reported event situated on a scale ranging from IMPORTANT to UNIMPORTANT:

- A *significant* [IMPORTANCE: IMPORTANT] weather vane among MPs, Mr Yeo claimed it had only been a 'very small number of people who have been conspiring'. (Guardian 1)
- He provides no detailed explanation of which reports are incorrect and which *insignificant* [IMPORTANCE: UNIMPORTANT]. (COBUILD)

The parameter of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY deals with what has traditionally been described as deontic or dynamic modality, i.e. with the writer's evaluation of what is (not) necessary or (not) possible.³ The two notions (possibility and necessity) are in fact closely connected and can be associated with the same parameter because they are logically related: 'It is not possible for you to leave' is logically equivalent to 'It is necessary for you not to leave/to stay' (on logical relations and modality see Lyons 1977: 787, Coates 1983: 19f, Palmer 2001: 90ff). Semantically, and conceptually, possibility and necessity are located on a scale:



It is not necessary for you not to do x It is necessary for you not to do x

Examples of evaluations of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY are:

- ... and this is how it *should* [POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: NECESSARY] be: Pelé acting as an ambassador for the sport on a visit to Newcastle yesterday (Times 10)
- 'She *didn't need* to [POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: NOT NECESSARY] tell us that she'd been to see Marlette in New York.' (COBUILD)

- Britain's word *can* [POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: POSSIBLE] still be of value in some parts of the world (Coates 1983: 90)
- His *inability* [POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY: NOT POSSIBLE] to answer a number of questions and his insistence that Labour MP James Plaskitt was 'wrong' – when it turned out his calculations were right – prompted Labour MP Angela Eagle to accuse him of 'barefaced cynicism'. (Express 4)

However, not all instances of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY appear to be equally evaluative, and what is sometimes called *objective* modality (Lyons 1977) is better excluded from the analysis. Indicating deontic modality, a sentence such as *Alfred must be unmarried* can be paraphrased as 'Alfred is obliged to be unmarried' (objective) or 'I (hereby) oblige Alfred to be unmarried' (subjective) (Lyons 1977: 793). In other words, the central question is 'whether or not the modal in question involves the speaker in the utterance' (Verstraete 2001: 1509), whether the speaker is the 'deontic source' (Lyons 1977: 843) (for a different conception of subjective modality see Perkins 1983: 101–102, Halliday 1994: 355, Sanders and Spooren 1997: 107). Examples of objective modality are reports of permissions or obligations that seem to involve no speaker subjectivity, and are hardly instances of speaker evaluation:

- In it, she says: 'This particular phase of my life is the most dangerous – X (she names someone who *cannot* be identified for legal reasons) is planning "an accident" in my car. Brake failure & serious head injury in order to make the path clear for Charles to marry.' (Mail 5) (LEGAL REASONS)
- Her escorts were under *no obligation* to have sex and *could* cancel a date at any point. (Telegraph 8) (REPORTED OBLIGATION/PERMISSION)
- England *must* win or draw Saturday's match in Turkey to qualify automatically for next year's European Championships. (Mail 10) (RULE)

Expressions of modality that refer to a news actor's ability (dynamic modality) have also been disregarded in the analysis, for example:

- Her mastery of languages, including Japanese, Arabic and Greek, *enabled* her to communicate with a wide-range of high-rolling clients, while her time at Reims management school rounded out her business education. (FT 8)
- Police sources were *unable* to say last night if either Dica's wife or children had become infected. (Mail 3)
- His *inability* to answer a number of questions and his insistence that Labour MP James Plaskitt was 'wrong' – when it turned out his calculations were right – prompted Labour MP Angela Eagle to accuse him of 'barefaced cynicism'. (Express 4)

However, such instances have affinities to evaluations of MENTAL STATE: they are comments on the ability or capacity of news actors, and can hence evoke negative evaluation, as in the final example above. As Hunston (p.c.) has pointed out, they can often act as a signal that some kind of evaluation is going on.

Just as evaluations of POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY are related to deontic and dynamic modality, evaluations of RELIABILITY are connected to what is generally described as epistemic modality, i.e. to matters of reliability, certainty, confidence and likelihood. The parameter of RELIABILITY goes beyond this, however, to include both the writer's evaluation of the reliability of a proposition and his/her evaluation of the genuineness of an entity or entities. There are hence five values subsumed under this parameter: FAKE, GENUINE, LOW, MEDIAN, HIGH:

- The sense of shock felt among Britain's senior police officers yesterday was *genuine* [RELIABILITY: GENUINE]. (Independent 7)
- Scores of defiant delegates sat on their hands rather than be whipped into a mood of *artificial* [RELIABILITY: FAKE] enthusiasm. (Sun 1)
- The Conservative party left its annual conference last night divided over whether to ditch Iain Duncan Smith as leader before Christmas, as rebels and loyalists geared up for a febrile weekend of politicking that *could* [RELIABILITY: LOW] determine his fate (FT 1)
- Dica's lawyers said they would appeal, and the case is *likely to* [RELIABILITY: MEDIAN] go to the Lords. (Independent 3)
- 'If she made about £100,000 in a year, after advertising, phone and travel costs, the poor woman was left with barely £5,000.' That is *certainly* [RELIABILITY: HIGH] not a view shared by the French police (Mail 8)

The first two values (FAKE/GENUINE) refer to the evaluation of the 'genuineness' of entities – writers evaluate aspects of reported events as real (e.g. *genuine*, *real*) or artificial (e.g. *artificial*, *choreographed*, *fake*). The remaining values (LOW, MEDIAN, HIGH) refer to the evaluation of the likelihood of propositions being true and have been adopted from Halliday (1994). He names three variables of modal judgements,⁴ one of them being the 'VALUE that is attached to modal judgement' (Halliday 1994: 358), which may be high (CERTAIN, MUST), median (PROBABLE, WILL) or low (POSSIBLE, MAY). Again, it is a scale or continuum of such meanings that we are concerned with rather than discrete values. So LOW actually means *lowest*, MEDIAN means *more or less median*, HIGH means *highest*, and even within these values, further scaling would be possible (if not practicable in terms of methodology). Furthermore, LOW does not indicate complete writer uncertainty and HIGH does not suggest complete certainty: in fact, unmodalized propositions always express higher reliability than propositions involving evaluations of RELIABILITY (Halliday 1994: 89). Unmodalized propositions should thus actually be seen as 'represent[ing] a particular intersubjective stance' (White 2003b: 265).

4.3 Peripheral evaluative parameters

Peripheral evaluative parameters do not involve evaluative scales as such, and do not indicate the same kind of qualitative evaluation of entities, situations or propositions as do core evaluative parameters. However, they do tend to occur in evaluative stretches of text, and can be related to evaluation in a variety of ways.

For example, the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY is mentioned in many studies of evaluation (e.g. in research on appraisal, stance, commitment), and evidential evaluators, or evidentials have been said to '*evaluate* the truth value of a sentence ... with respect to the source of the information contained in the sentence' (Rooryck 2001, emphasis mine). In other words, the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY deals with writers' evaluations of the 'evidence' for their knowledge. In my sub-classification of EVIDENTIALITY (based on the corpus) there are six different dimensions (or sub-values) of this parameter: HEARSAY, MINDSAY, PERCEPTION, GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, (LACK OF) PROOF and UNSPECIFIED. For HEARSAY the utterance is evaluated as having been uttered by a 'Sayer' (Halliday 1994: 140) who is not the writer ('*The whips will be on the phone over the weekend to all the constituency chairmen of those who have been identified as being involved in the plot*'), said one source (Express 1) (= quoted speech), whereas for MINDSAY the utterance is evaluated as having been thought/felt/experienced by a 'Senser' (Halliday 1994: 117) who is someone other than the writer ('... *and what is the use of a book*,' thought Alice, '*without pictures or conversations*' (Carroll 1998: 9)) (= quoted mental experience). The value of PERCEPTION encompasses three different kinds of perception which have been reduced to one general parameter for methodological purposes: 'mental perception' (Greenbaum 1969: 205) (SEEM, APPEAR, LOOK), sensory perception (SEE, VISIBLY, AUDIBLY) and 'showing' (REVEAL, SHOW, BETRAY). Mental perception shades into sensory perception in any case, and the difference between sensory perception and showing is predominantly one of construal. With GENERAL KNOWLEDGE the propositional content of what is modified is evaluated as based on what is regarded as part of the communal epistemic background shared by the audience and the writer (FAMOUSLY, INFAMOUSLY), whereas PROOF relates to an evaluation of the sourced proposition as being based on some sort of 'hard proof' (PROOF THAT). The last value, UNSPECIFIED, is the most problematic. It encompasses a range of evaluators which express different evidential specifications that cannot be grouped under one functional label – for example, it *emerged that*, *meaning that*/*that means* (for other classifications of evidentiality see Chafe and Nichols 1986, Rooryck 2001):

EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY	He said they were right.
EVIDENTIALITY: MINDSAY	He thought they were right.
EVIDENTIALITY: GENERAL KNOWLEDGE	It's well known they were right.
EVIDENTIALITY: UNSPECIFIED	It emerged that they were right.
EVIDENTIALITY: PERCEPTION	There are signs they were right.

EVIDENTIALITY: PROOF

Evidently, they were right.
(invented examples)

The different sub-values of EVIDENTIALITY thus do not directly relate to a cline of evaluative meaning, but rather refer to the different *sources* of propositions. However, these sources in turn carry evaluations of RELIABILITY, in that, for example, GENERAL KNOWLEDGE or PROOF are generally considered as more reliable sources than PERCEPTION. (This is discussed in detail in the section on EVIDENTIALITY/RELIABILITY in Chapter 6.)

The second peripheral evaluative parameter, MENTAL STATE, refers to the writer's evaluation of other social actors' mental states. Here the sub-values are associated with the different kinds of mental states actors can experience: beliefs, emotions, expectations, knowledge, wishes/intentions, etc. (see the section on EVIDENTIALITY/MENTAL STATE in Chapter 6):

- The letter is said to have been written to her butler, Paul Burrell, and was reproduced in yesterday's *Daily Mirror* after the name of the individual *suspected* [MENTAL STATE: BELIEF] by the Princess had been blacked out. (Times 5)
- But rookie officers face jail as *appalled* [MENTAL STATE: EMOTION] chiefs plan charges for hate views caught in BBC film. (Express 7)
- The day began with *high expectations* [MENTAL STATE: EXPECTATION] as No 10 announced that elections to the Stormont Assembly would be held on November 26. (Mirror 6)
- University researcher Dr Dominic Malcolm was involved in a recent study showing that nearly half of all players *knew* [MENTAL STATE: KNOWLEDGE] other pros who took recreational drugs. (Mirror 10)
- And the *weary* [MENTAL STATE: STATE-OF-MIND] PM flew back to London empty-handed, rather than chair gruelling all-night talks, after Unionists demanded proof the IRA had decommissioned its weapons. (Sun 6)
- For the conspiracy theorists who have spent six years *pondering* [MENTAL STATE: PROCESS] the significance of the missing white Fiat and the behaviour of the pursuing paparazzi pack, it was manna from a news stand – nine pages of newspaper detailing how Diana, Princess of Wales, believed she would be murdered in a staged car crash. (Independent 5)
- An asylum seeker who *deliberately* [MENTAL STATE: VOLITION] infected two women with the Aids virus was facing a long jail sentence last night. (Mail 3)
- So how did such an intelligent, cultivated and, in her youth, extremely attractive woman *end up* [MENTAL STATE: NON-VOLITION] running the world's biggest international vice ring? (Mail 8)

This parameter is clearly an instance of peripheral, or marginal evaluation: descriptions of social actors' mental states might be argued to be interpretative-descriptive, rather than evaluative (although the distinction between evaluation and interpretation may be rather difficult to pinpoint),

and are for instance excluded in Biber and Finegan's (1989) concept of stance:

we focused only on markers of stance that were direct and explicit expressions of speaker attitude, ignoring more integrated markers of attitude. Thus we counted constructions like *I fear xxx*, *it frightens me*, *I am frightened*, which directly express the speaker's own stance, but we did not investigate constructions like *it frightens her*, *he was frightened*, or *that must have been a frightening experience* because they are **primarily descriptive** rather than directly expressive of the speaker's *own* feelings, even when they give a secondary indication of those feelings.

(Biber and Finegan 1989: 97, italics in the original, emphasis mine)

It seems obvious that there is a crucial difference between reporting one's own mental state (*I love linguistics*) (which implies writer approval, and therefore combines the parameters of MENTAL STATE and EMOTIVITY; 'linguistics is good') and reporting mental states of other social actors (*She loves linguistics*) (which tells us nothing about the writer's approval or disapproval). (The former do not occur in my data, and will therefore not be discussed here.)

On the other hand, such descriptions are in fact included by other researchers on evaluation and related concepts – for example, in work on subjectivity (Scheibman 2002), research on 'assessives' (Vestergaard 2000) and in appraisal theory. Arguably, they do involve evaluation in some way: in an utterance such as *my mother's never happy* 'the mother's *happiness* is an **evaluation** of her character by the speaker (the daughter)' (Scheibman 2002: 133, italics in the original, emphasis mine). This type of evaluation is the result of the special character of mental state descriptions, which refer to A-events (Chapter 6.1.2, p. 155), and can therefore be regarded as expressing claims by the speaker

to have a knowledge or insight into the human subject's mental disposition, namely their desires or intentions, and through that claim suggests an *evaluation* of the human subject following from whether the 'inclination' is socially assessed as positive or negative, as appropriate or inappropriate.

(White 1998: 103, emphasis mine)

Clearly, in the sense that writers cannot evidentially experience mental states of others, descriptions of news actors' mental states cannot be considered factual and non-evaluative (Vestergaard 2000: 160).

Finally, such descriptions are arguably used to '[establish] a stance towards a particular socio-semiotic reality via the affectual values [the writer] attributes to representatives of that reality' (White 1998: 102). They do this by 'by trigger[ing] sympathetic or unsympathetic responses in the reader/listener' (White 1998: 102). In other words, descriptions of mental states *systematically* evoke evaluation while not inscribing it directly.

Now, *evoled* evaluations have normally not been included in the frequency calculation, but mental state descriptions differ from 'ordinary' evoked evaluation in the aforementioned *systematicity*. As such, they may be regarded as being somewhere between evaluation and non-evaluation, and

arguably have a very special status. They are neither completely evaluative nor completely non-evaluative. As a compromise, I propose to treat such instances as peripheral or marginal evaluation.

A different problem is that *when* mental states are included in research on evaluation, it is often only expressions of emotion and volition that are analysed (e.g. in appraisal theory). However, *all* mental state expressions refer to A-events, and are in that respect interpretative-evaluative. Moreover, there is a cline in their meaning. This continuum (between the categories of BELIEF, EMOTION, EXPECTATION, KNOWLEDGE, STATE-OF-MIND and PROCESS) would make it difficult to justify the exclusion of one but not the other. KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF and EXPECTATION are certainly epistemically connected (when does belief become knowledge, when does expectation become belief?), but there is also a cline between BELIEF and EMOTION: are RESPECT (paraphrasable as 'believe that worthy'), TRUST ('believe that honest and sincere') and TAKE SERIOUSLY ('believe that important/serious') evaluations of BELIEF or EMOTION? Furthermore, the boundaries between emotions and states-of-mind are far from clear (does PUZZLED refer to an emotion or to a state-of-mind? Does CAREFULLY suggest an emotion like Dixon (1991: 79) claims or cognition as one might also argue?). Finally, there is also a cline between STATE-OF-MIND and BELIEF (is UNSUSPECTING BELIEF or STATE-OF-MIND?).

To solve these problems I have adopted a broad definition of both BELIEF and EMOTION, in that the borderline cases RESPECT, TRUST and TAKE SERIOUSLY are included as BELIEF, whereas EMOTION encompasses prototypical emotional states such as anger, fear, or fury, as well as extensions of these states like bitterness, disaffectedness or optimism. All MENTAL STATE evaluations include both direct modifications of Senses and metonymic modifications of Senses, i.e. the description of a (speech) activity as FRANTIC, STORMY, VEHEMENTLY, HEATED or CHARGED. (These are metonymic in that there is a clear contiguity relation between the Senses – the one who performs the activity – and the activity itself. Sometimes they just imply that there are strong feelings involved without specifying the type of feeling.) Moreover, I have included lexical items that only suggest mental states as some part of their meaning (FLINCH, SALUTE, PLUCK UP THE COURAGE, TIE ONESELF IN KNOTS) and those that *cause* a social actor to feel something (STRESSFUL, STRIKE A CHORD). The category of STATE-OF-MIND is a bit of a catch-all, unfortunately, but comprises all mental states which did not easily fit into either BELIEF, EMOTION, EXPECTATION or KNOWLEDGE. Let me point out again that I regard these sub-values not as distinct categories but as a continuum of related meanings, with a core semantic difference (rather like prototypicality).

Finally, evaluations of STYLE concern the writer's evaluation of the language that is used, for instance, comments on the manner in which the information is presented, or evaluations of the kind of language that is used (Biber *et al.* 1999: 975). These comments can relate to the speaker's own

discourse (STYLE: SELF) or the discourse of third parties (STYLE: OTHER). Since no examples of STYLE: SELF occur in my data, no further attempts at sub-classification have been made, and this sub-value is only included for the sake of systematicity in the framework above (Figure 4.1). In the newspaper corpus only examples of STYLE: OTHER occur. Such evaluations are important (and will be discussed) only in connection with reporting expressions (verbs, nouns, adjectives, adverbs) which can be classified according to the following sub-values:

- NEUTRAL: e.g. SAY, TELL
- ILLOCUTIONARY: e.g. DEMAND, PROMISE
- DECLARATIVE: e.g. ACQUIT, PLEAD GUILTY
- DISCOURSE SIGNALING: e.g. ADD, CONCLUDE
- PARALINGUISTIC: e.g. WHISPER, SCREAM.

This classification has been adopted (in a modified form) from Caldas-Coulthard (1994), the modifications deriving from the empirical analysis of the corpus:

- NEUTRAL attributing expressions 'simply signal the illocutionary act – the saying. By using these verbs, the author only gives the reader the "literal meaning" ... of the speech. The intended meaning (illocutionary force) has to be derived from the saying itself' (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 305). In other words, the expressions do not tell us anything about the speaker's purpose. Examples are: *according to, as far as X is/are concerned, SAY, SPEAK OF, TALK, TELL*.
- ILLOCUTIONARY attributing expressions on the other hand make explicit the speaker's (supposed) purpose. They 'convey the presence of the author in the text, and are highly interpretive. They name a supposed speech situation, they clarify and make explicit the illocutionary force of the quote they refer to' (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 305f). Some examples are ACCUSE, ADVISE, BEG, BLAME, CHALLENGE, COMPLAIN, DECLARE, DEFEND, INSIST, OFFER, ORDER, PERSUADE, PLEDGE, QUESTION, REQUEST, RUMOUR, STRESS, SUGGEST, THREATEN, URGE, VOW, WARN. No attempt has been made to sub-classify these (as types of illocution). Moreover, I adopt a very broad definition of *illocutionary* which is not completely equivalent to Searle's (1976) classification in that it includes all sorts of comments on the Sayer's purpose and the type of speech act involved.
- DECLARATIVE attributing expressions (not identified by Caldas-Coulthard) refer to linguistic acts that can only be 'felicitous' within a cultural-institutional setting, when specific constraining circumstances are fulfilled (such as who can be the Sayer). Thus, it is only in court that you can be *acquitted* of something and it is only the Judge who can ADJOURN, RULE or RETURN A VERDICT. Other examples in the corpus are AWARD, CHARGE, CLEAR, CONVICT, DIAGNOSE, FINE, FIND GUILTY, HEAR, SENTENCE. The category DECLARATIVE is thus

employed in a narrow definition, unlike Searle's (1976) category of *declarations*, which includes 'declarations that concern language itself, as for example, when one says, "I define, abbreviate, name, call or dub"' (Searle 1976: 14f). The reason for this is that, as Stubbs (1986) rightly points out, declarations such as EXCOMMUNICATE or CHRISTEN are different from declarations such as PROMISE. The first type (EXCOMMUNICATE) is 'institutional and conventional' (Stubbs 1986: 12) and can only be performed by someone 'by virtue of occupying some social role' (Stubbs 1986: 12), whereas the second type (PROMISE) can be performed by 'anyone whose English is good enough to convey their intention: that is, anyone can make promises, requests, complaints, etc.' (Stubbs 1986: 12). The above sub-classification reflects this distinction: type 1 of Searle's declarations corresponds to DECLARATIVE expressions, while type 2 expressions belong to the ILLOCUTIONARY value.

- The DISCOURSE SIGNALLING sub-value refers to expressions that 'mark the relationship of the quote to other parts of the discourse ... or mark the development of the discourse' (Caldas-Coulthard 1994: 306), as for example ADD, CONCLUDE, GO ON, REPLY.
- PARALINGUISTIC attributing expressions give an indication of prosodic and other accompanying paralinguistic aspects of the act of utterance. There are only a few examples in the corpus: *muttered, shouts of, whispered, screamed, sobbed*.

4.4 Evaluative interplay

When we look at actual linguistic expressions of evaluative parameters we find that lexical items often realize two or more parameters at the same time (cf. also Lemke 1998: 37). In other words, evaluative parameters can be *combined*. For example, reporting verbs often combine an evaluation of *EVIDENTIALITY* (marking the source of the writer's knowledge as HEARSAY) with an evaluation of *STYLE* (commenting on the language used):

- He *said that* [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: NEUTRAL] after the death of weapons expert Dr David Kelly 'Tony Blair said he'd had nothing to do with his public naming. That was a lie. 'He chaired the meetings that made the fatal decisions. He is responsible. He should do the decent thing and resign.' One delegate *muttered* [EVIDENTIALITY: HEARSAY/STYLE: PARALINGUISTIC]: 'Like you.' (Mirror 1)

Similarly, expressions of *EVIDENTIALITY* usually express *RELIABILITY* (Chapter 6). The phenomenon also becomes obvious when looking at individual linguistic expressions – for example, *PAR FOR THE COURSE*, which 'is almost always used about events or behaviours which are reported as "bad" and then claimed to be "expected"' (Channell 2000: 50). Hence, *PAR FOR THE COURSE* expresses the speaker's expectations (*EXPECTEDNESS*) as well as his/her disapproval (*EMOTIVITY*).

Furthermore, when we go to actual text there is a tremendous interplay between different parameters of evaluation (cf. also Lemke 1998: 43). In a single utterance, two or more parameters of evaluation can be expressed, though there may be potential restrictions on combinations of parameters. We can describe this as a 'collocation' of evaluative parameters:

- *Surprisingly, perhaps*, order is among them, as *can* be clearly seen where a passive is used in the subordinate clause (Palmer 2001: 195).

In this clause, we can find evaluations of *EXPECTEDNESS* (*surprisingly*) and *RELIABILITY* (*perhaps*), with the evaluation of *RELIABILITY* referring to the evaluation of *EXPECTEDNESS* itself (*perhaps* has only *surprisingly* in its scope). Additionally, there is an evaluation along the parameter of *POSSIBILITY* (*can*).⁵

Thus, there are two types of *evaluative interplay*:

- (1) linguistic expressions evaluate along two or more parameters at the same time (*PAR FOR THE COURSE*)
- (2) in a given text different linguistic expressions evaluate along two or more parameters (*Surprisingly, perhaps* ...).

Both of these kinds of multilayering seem highly fascinating but largely disregarded phenomena; the first in particular will constitute one of the main foci of Chapters 5 and 6, where the evaluative combinations that occur in the corpus will be commented on. The second phenomenon plays a role when discussing evaluation within its context. As will be seen, one of the main advantages of a parameter-based approach to evaluation is that it is flexible enough to allow an appropriate analysis of both phenomena.

What remains to be emphasized at this point is that there are no hard-and-fast distinctions between the proposed parameters but rather overlaps and indeterminacies, and that the parameters themselves are not equal in status and type.

4.5 Attribution and averral

Before moving on to the empirical analysis a further matter remains to be discussed. This is the distinction between *authorial* and *non-authorial* evaluation (White 1998). As was mentioned above (Chapter 2), one of the characteristic features of newspaper language is its 'embeddedness': much of what features in the news is actually reported speech. As this book is concerned with *writer* evaluation rather than evaluation in general, it seems reasonable to exclude evaluations that are *attributed* to someone else. The distinction between authorial and non-authorial voice, and reported speech and non-reported speech has recently been discussed in terms of the difference between *attribution* and *averral*. These notions go back to Sinclair (1986, 1988), who states that

Averral

As far as averral is concerned, I adopt Hunston's distinction between non-sourced and sourced averrals (Hunston 2000). Sourced averrals give information about the source (or evidence) on which the writer's averral is based – for example, via the use of evidentials (Hunston 2000: 181). These types of information are accordingly handled in my framework as evaluations of EVIDENTIALITY. Non-sourced averrals give no indication about the source of the writer's knowledge. However, the distinction is not as clear-cut as it seems, as 'there can be indeterminacy between sourced and non-sourced averrals' (Hunston 2000: 192). There is also gradience between sourced averrals and attributions (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Sourced averral and attribution

<i>Attribution</i>	He said that Mr Duncan Smith was wrong.
<i>Sourced averral</i>	Yesterday's poll of activists showed that Mr Duncan Smith was wrong.
<i>Non-sourced averral</i>	Mr Duncan Smith was wrong. (invented examples)

Attributions are based on what Sayers/Sensors said or thought (*He said that*), whereas sourced averrals can be based on the writer's *interpretation of* a piece of writing (*Yesterday's poll ... showed that*). The distinction is a very fine one and shows the gradience between attributions and (some types of) sourced averrals. This overlap is explicable by the fact that both sourced averrals and attributions are evaluations along the same parameter, namely EVIDENTIALITY. In the parameter-based framework of evaluation, both HEARSAY and MINDSAY involve attribution, whereas PERCEPTION, GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, PROOF and UNSPECIFIED involve sourced averrals (Figure 4.2):




Figure 4.2 Attribution and averral

As will be seen later, the connection between evaluation and attribution/averral is even more multifaceted because the parameter of EVIDENTIALITY can be combined with other parameters, allowing for a complex manipulation of attribution and averral on the part of the writer (see Appendix 3 for a detailed and complete outline of this proposed system of EVIDENTIALITY).

Notes

1. Apart from Graduation: force; compare the discussion on intensity below, and SERIOUSNESS because this does not occur in my data. There is in fact one occurrence each of *ironically* both in the tabloids and in the broadsheets. But although Lemke (1998) mentions IRONIC as an evaluation of humorousness/seriousness (see Chapter 3), this assumption appears problematic. Rather than regarding *ironically* as evaluating an aspect of the reported event as HUMOROUS/SERIOUS, it could also be regarded as an evaluation of contrast. However, irony is too different a notion from the kind of contrast expressed by the contrastive evaluators BUT, ALTHOUGH, etc. to be included within the parameter of EXPECTEDNESS: CONTRAST. On the whole, irony seems to be a special case which is very complex and whose analysis is beyond the scope of this study (on irony see e.g. Marino 1994, Sperber and Wilson 1981). In any case, the parameter of SERIOUSNESS seems to be extremely rare in news stories. This is in line with Lemke's (1998) findings for seven editorials in American and Irish newspapers and his suggestion that SERIOUSNESS seems to be a marginal parameter (Lemke 1998: 46).
2. My thanks go to Geoff Thompson for suggesting this distinction.
3. No distinction is made between possibility, permission and ability (see Coates 1983 on the cline involved with these notions). The notion of appropriateness which is part of Lemke's parameter of normativity/appropriateness is for me best included as EMOTIVITY rather than POSSIBILITY/NECESSITY in that appropriateness usually implies the speaker's approval.
4. For Halliday (1994) modal judgements pertain to the notions of probability, usuality, obligation and inclination, and he also applies the concept of value to all of these notions. However, I have only adopted the distinction between HIGH, LOW and MEDIAN for RELIABILITY. Even here it is sometimes questionable as to how far expressions of RELIABILITY may be classified according to these three discrete categories. I agree with Nuyts (2001a) who states that
English ... [has] basic terminology only for, most precisely, certainty, probability, possibility, improbability, and impossibility. But speakers can further scalarize these positions by means of grading expressions (*very probable, rather certain, not entirely impossible, etc.*). And ultimately, if really needed, they can even quantify likelihood (e.g., *a 90 percent chance*). It is hard to see how a 'discrete categories' approach can handle these facts.
(Nuyts 2001a: 22)

On the other hand, if evaluators of **RELIABILITY** were only to be classified according to two values (**HIGH**–**LOW**) as with the other parameters, it would be extremely problematic to decide where to put evaluators such as *likely*, since it appears to express a higher degree of reliability than, for example, **MAY/MIGHT** but a lower degree of reliability than, for example, **WILL/BE TO**. As such, despite its drawbacks the adopted approach seems most suitable to the analysis of evaluations of **RELIABILITY**. In any case, the problem is the same with all parameters of evaluation which involve scales: the decision to focus on two or three positions on the scale falsifies the actual discourse semantics to some extent.

5. *Clearly* seems to retain its function as a manner adjunct here (rather than as a disjunct expressing **COMPREHENSIBILITY**).

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